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Abstract
EU trade and investment policy is in flux. The rate at which the global trade and investment
architecture is evolving through the mega-regional Free Trade Agreements (“FTAs”) is unprecedented. In this context, we explain how European lawyers and trade negotiators are addressing the
newly acquired investment competence, while at the same time reforming investment arbitration
and proposing new systems of dispute resolution at the international level. EU trade negotiators
have put forward transformative proposals for investment chapters in their FTAs to safeguard,
above all, the autonomy of the EU legal order in its relationship with international arbitration law.
By mapping the clash between the investor-State adjudication regime and the EU legal order, we
identify the possible legal tools needed to overcome them. Moreover, while supporting the new
EU judicial architecture and its procedural rules through an Investment Court System (“ICS”),
rather than traditional Investor-State Dispute Settlement (“ISDS”) clauses, we propose greater engagement with State-to-State arbitration and further substantive reforms for a truly transformative
adjudication system addressing global inequalities created by the current investment regime.
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Settlement (“ISDS”) clauses, we propose greater engagement with
State-to-State arbitration and further substantive reforms for a truly
transformative adjudication system addressing global inequalities
created by the current investment regime.
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INTRODUCTION
In delimiting the EU’s new competence in the field of direct
investments under Article 207(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union (“TFEU”), this provision, read together with
Article 3(1)(e) TFEU, has left some important gaps in demarcating
the scope of investment protection rules as part of the EU’s common
commercial policy. While the EU has acquired a new power and is
finally “catching up” with the regime of bilateral investment treaties
(“BITs”), the Commission is negotiating and concluding new megaregional Free Trade Agreements (“FTAs”), such as the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (“TTIP”), the EU-Singapore and
EU-Vietnam bilateral agreements and the newly released
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with Canada
(“CETA 2016”).3 Because of the political relevance of TTIP and the
public consultation launched by the Commission on Investor State
3. Pending the publishing of this article, the European Commission and the Canadian
government have agreed to include a new approach on investment protection and investment
dispute settlement in the CETA, which almost entirely implements the one put forward by the
Commission in its Proposal of 21 November 2015 for Investment Protection and Resolution of
Investment Disputes Proposal in the TTIP. See Chapter II, Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership, E.U.-U.S. (unratified as of Aug. 2016), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf [hereinafter 2015 TTIP Proposal]. Following
the legal revision of the text by the Commission, the CETA was made public on February 29,
2016. See Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, E.U.-Can. (unratified as of Aug.
2016), available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/index_it.htm [hereinafter
CETA]. A few weeks before, on February 1st, the text of the FTA with Vietnam, as it had
been negotiated by the Parties – which content may change following the legal revision by the
Commission – was finalized. See EU-Vietnam Trade Agreement, E.U.-Viet. (unratified as of
Aug. 2016), available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/
vietnam/ [hereinafter EU-Viet. FTA]. This agreement, like the CETA, has been shaped on the
2015 TTIP Proposal. The authors took this evolution into account, as far as possible, which
touches upon several issues at the core of this article, including: the establishment of a
permanent investment tribunal and of an appeal system; the future institution of a permanent
multilateral investment court; and the exclusion of EU law from the jurisdiction of the
tribunals.
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Dispute Settlement (“ISDS”) on March 27 2014 – which results have
been published on January 13 20154 – the regime of investment
arbitration has sparked public interest questions of judicial
accountability, transparency and democracy.
As Sophie Meunier has shown, the long-awaited transfer of
competence over investment law, brought by the Lisbon Treaty, from
the Member States to the EU – which enables the Union to negotiate
on their behalf in FTAs containing investment chapters –, has
happened by “stealth,” meaning that the tense political debate prior to
the shift of competence left open important questions on
implementation.5 For example, the German Constitutional Court
expressed caution on including such a broad investment protection in
competence, arguing instead that it should be confined to investment
as a controlling power over an enterprise.6 The EU has not yet
overcome the resistance of its Member States committed to
maintaining their BITs and to the protection of property according to
their different constitutional traditions.7
Moreover, it remains to be seen what the CJEU will state in its
Opinion 2/15 on the FTA with Singapore, as it was requested by the
Commission, in accordance with Article 218(11) TFEU, to rule on the
delimitation of competences between the EU and Member States in
the field of external investment law. In particular, the Commission
asked the Court whether the Union has the requisite competence to

4. COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT, REPORT, ONLINE PUBLIC CONSULTATION
ON INVESTMENT PROTECTION AND INVESTOR-TO-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (ISDS) IN THE
TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (Jan. 13, 2015),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153044.pdf
[hereinafter
TTIP
Consultation].
5. See Sophie Meunier, Integration By Stealth: How The European Union Gained
Competence Over Foreign Direct Investment (Dec. 23, 2013) (paper for the 7th Annual
Conference of the Political Economy of International Organizations, January 16-18, 2014,
Princeton University), http://www.uni-heidelberg.de/md/awi/peio/meunier_05.09.2013.pdf, at
2.
6. See Meunier, supra note 5, at 12. See August Reinisch, The EU on the Investment
Path, (unpublished draft paper), available at http://law.scu.edu/wp-content/uploads/investment/
Reinisch-EU-Investment-Law-Quo-Vadis-26-01-2013.pdf at n.7 (citing the German
Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08, 30 June 2009, ¶ 379).
7. See Presentation by Joakim Reiter, Deputy Secretary General UNCTAD at the XXIV
Meeting of the Trade Policy Experts Group (Mar. 15, 2016) (explaining that the difference
between Sweden and Germany vis-a-vis to BITs lies also in the different protection of property
that can be found in the Swedish constitution but not in the German one) (notes from the
presentation on file with author).
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sign and conclude the agreement without the involvement of the
Member States.8
The political tensions and ambiguities left in the Treaty of
Lisbon over the external EU investment competence have created
new challenges but also opened new avenues to reform international
investment regimes and their dispute mechanism. Initially, to avoid
the clashes between intra-EU BITs, the Commission launched a series
of infringement proceedings against Sweden, Austria, and Finland,
obliging the Member States to eliminate incompatibilities between
their international and EU law obligations in favor of the latter.9
Throughout the TTIP negotiations that began in 2013, and the most
recent CETA 2016 and the EU-Vietnam FTA, the EU has
demonstrated great transformative potential in setting aside old ISDS
clauses enforced by private arbitrators while establishing permanent
tribunals of first instance and appeal and aiming to consolidate a
multilateral investment Court system.
This transformative process began when the Commission
realized that, at least in the EU, the inclusion of ISDS clauses
remained one of the main “nails in the coffin” the TTIP negotiations
brought up, not only in international legal circles but also amongst the
EU and its Member States, across academia, and in civil society. Of
particular importance in the EU context are the aforementioned
results of the Commission’s public consultation launched on March
2014, followed by the Commission’s Concept Paper published in May
2015,10 the European Parliament’s resolution of July 8, 201511 and the
8. More specifically the Commission asked the CJEU the following questions: which
provisions of the agreement fall within the Union’s exclusive competence?; Which provisions
of the agreement fall within the Union’s shared competence?; Is there any provision of the
agreement that falls within the exclusive competence of the Member States? See Request for
an Opinion Submitted by the European Commission Pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU,
(Opinion 2/5), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=
&docid=170868&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2249
38.
9. See Nikos Lavranos, Member States’ Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs): Lost in
Transition?, in HAGUE YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 281-82 (Nikos Lavranos et al.
eds., 2011).
10. See Commission Concept Paper: Investment in TTIP and beyond – the path to reform
(May 15, 2015) available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_
153408.PDF last visited August 10, 2016 (hereinafter Commission Concept Paper).
11. The European Parliament, in its Resolution of July 8, 2015, has not rejected the
inclusion ex se of the ISDS clause in the TTIP. See Julie Levy-Abegnoli, TTIP: EU
Commission Unveils Replacement for Controversial ISDS, PARLIAMENT MAGAZINE (Sept. 16,
2015),
https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/articles/news/ttip-eu-commission-unveils-
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Commission’s 2015 TTIP Proposal.12 ISDS clauses were indeed an
incredibly controversial topic in the media and feared by civil society
in Europe, causing the Commission a huge setback in negotiations.
After a large stakeholder consultation encountered over 150,000
responses, the Commission elaborated a preliminary response
attempting to highlight the two major sites of the controversies around
investor-State arbitration and the right to regulate.13 While the
negotiators have argued that these responses would be used sparingly,
an UNCTAD report has shown that ISDS clauses do not necessarily
positively impact investment flows14 and lawyers have argued over
the limits of domestic courts and long awaited an international
investment court.15 Many host governments see these clauses as an
obstacle to environmental and social policies that will be challenged
in front of arbitrators rather than courts. On the other hand, investors
favor ISDS clauses for fear that host governments will adopt
legislation in conflict with investment or trade treaty obligations.
The position of the Commission resulted in a compromise
between these two polar positions in its Report on the consultation on
ISDS in TTIP. Here the Commission began signaling its initial
criticism to the traditional ISDS model. For instance, the Commission
explained how for small and medium-size enterprises the costs of
ISDS mechanisms remain too high, especially with the application of
the “loser pay” principle.16 Commissioner Malmström has explained
that there are already some 1,400 EU agreements (another 3,000
globally) in existence since the 1950s and that BITs are overall a
German invention.17 However, in response to the criticisms on ISDS,
in December 2015 David O’Sullivan, EU Ambassador to the United
States, addressed the ISDS challenge: “TTIP will allow us to improve
replacement-controversial-isds?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Daily+Parliament+
Magazine+Round-Up&utm_content=Daily+Parliament+Magazine+Round-Up+CID_
7aaab1fa16cc22afa94c82df5cfb75e5&utm_source=Email+newsletters&utm_term=TTIP+EU+
Commission+unveils+replacement+for+controversial+ISDS.
12. See Chapter II, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, supra note 3.
13. See TTIP Consultation, supra note 4, at 3.
14. See TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2014, UNCTAD (2014), http://unctad.org/
en/PublicationsLibrary/tdr2014_en.pdf.
15. See GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 180
(2007).
16. See TTIP Consultation, supra note 4, at 16, 22 (discussing various business NGOs
opposed to the principle).
17. Cecilia Malmström, EU Trade Comm’r, Eur. Comm’n, Speech at the Open Europe &
Friedrich Naumann Stiftung: Debating TTIP, (Dec. 11, 2014).
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them. We must acknowledge both their weaknesses (cases against
tobacco plain packaging legislation being an example of ‘ISDS gone
wrong’) and their benefits (preventing expropriation, for example,
with its consequent job losses).”18 The changing attitude of the
Commission towards the traditional ISDS model was fueled by
Phillip Morris’ challenge against Australian packaging regulations,
and the subsequent tobacco carve-out in order to avoid potential
investors’ claims of action in this sector for the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement (TPP) between the US and 11 other AsiaPacific nations.
In 2015, however, the Commission went further than just
introducing carve-out clauses with the TTIP’s transformative
investment proposal, moving away from the traditional ISDS model
of private arbitrators to create instead an Investment Court System,
constituted (“ICS”) by permanent tribunals. This was in response to
the criticisms expressed by the European Parliament, civil society,
some Member States and their national parliaments alike distrusting
the current international arbitration regimes for lack of democratic
accountability, consistency, openness and independence. Throughout
its TTIP negotiation position, the Commission progressively sought to
address both procedural and substantive criticism: starting from the
fact that international arbitrators ought to be more independent and
the system more open, it launched the proposal of permanent tribunals
with nominated permanent judges bound to ethical rules to prevent
conflicts of interest. In response to the lack of consistency and the
broad discretion of arbitrators in the application of general principles
(such as the right to regulate and the fair and equitable treatment
(“FET”) standard) the Commission drafted comprehensive tests
departing from notions of equity in customary international law
(“CIL”).
The establishment of permanent investment tribunals, of first
and second instance, is a prominent innovation of the latest reiteration
of the FTA with Vietnam as well as of the CETA 2016, which both
further engage in the creation of a multilateral court system replacing

18. Letter by David O’Sullivan, Ambassador of the European Union to the United States,
Responding to TTIP Criticisms (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.euintheus.org/press-media/letterby-david-osullivan-responding-to-ttip-criticisms/.
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the investment tribunals.19 As to the CETA 2016, a permanent
Tribunal, with fifteen appointed members in equal numbers by the
EU, Canada, and third parties for terms of five years, will also have
high ethical standards about their independence and possible conflicts
of interest.20 In following the approach of TTIP, CETA 2016 ensures
consistency in adjudication with the creation of a permanent
“Appellate Tribunal” that will uphold, modify or reverse the
Tribunal’s awards and will be constituted by a decision of the CETA
Joint Committee.21 The EU-Vietnam FTA establishes as well a
Tribunal of first instance of nine members22 and an “Appeal
Tribunal,” constituted by six judges once again appointed in equal
number by the EU, Vietnam and third countries.23 While CETA
leaves it to the Joint Committee to decide the procedures of the
Appellate Tribunal, the EU-Vietnam FTA, like the TTIP 2015
Proposal, specifies judges’ salaries, appellate procedures and goes as
far as stating that the Appeal Tribunal should decide by consensus or
anonymous majority voting.24 However, the long-term goal of both
CETA 2016 and EU-Vietnam Tribunals is to transform this bilateral
system into a multilateral one that could eventually also incorporate
the TTIP tribunals.25
This transformative proposal has met lots of resistance,
especially amongst US trade circles, in which lawyers have warned
against overstating the benefits of a permanent system of investment
disputes between States and investors, the unintended consequences
of a more “consistent” investment regime with less flexibility, and the
costly procedures coinciding with greater accountability in decision-

19. See Commission Press Release, CETA: EU and Canada Agree on New Approach on
Investment in Trade Agreement, IP/16/399 (Feb. 29, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_IP-16-399_en.htm.
20. See CETA, supra note 3, arts. 8.27 and 8.30.
21. CETA, supra note 3, art. 8.28. For an explanation, see Press Release, CETA: EU and
Canada Agree on New Approach on Investment in Trade Agreement (Feb. 29, 2016),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-399_en.htm.
22. See EU-Viet. Free Trade Agreement, Ch. II of Ch. 8, Sect. 3, supra note 3, art. 12, ¶
2; 2015 TTIP Proposal, supra note 3, Ch. II, art. 9.
23. See EU-Viet. Free Trade Agreement, Ch. II of Ch. 8, Sect. 3, supra note 3, art. 13, ¶
2; 2015 TTIP Proposal, supra note 3, Ch. II, art. 10.
24. See EU-Viet. Free Trade Agreement, Ch. II. of Ch. 8, Sect. 3, supra note 3, art. 13, ¶
12.
25. See CETA, supra note 3, art. 8.29; EU-Viet. Free Trade Agreement, Ch. II of Ch. 8,
Sect. 3, supra note 3, art. 15.
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making.26 When compared to the US and the recent TPP agreement,
the EU appears in CETA 2016 and the EU-Vietnam FTA as an
equally influential global actor, yet more committed to transformative
reforms and greater engagement and responsiveness to its civil
society.27
However, we argue that the transformative EU proposal stems,
above all, from internal constraints such as the need to safeguard the
EU legal order and to avoid jurisdictional clashes, as well as the need
to reconcile the opposing notions of the right to regulate for public
interest, and the fair and equitable treatment of foreign investments.28
In Section I, we show the rationale for why the EU should remain
committed to the inclusion of investor-State adjudication in its FTAs,
such as the new ICS – in contrast with old fashioned ISDS clauses.
This includes the risk of politicization arising from systems of dispute
resolution governed only by diplomatic protection and State-to-State
arbitration, as well as from the lack of direct effect of international
trade agreements. Section II shows that the Commission has
introduced important provisions in its EU-Vietnam FTA and CETA
2016, which aim at preserving the right to regulate for public policies
and create a clear and objective test to interpret the FET standard
beyond the vague equity principles derived from CIL. Regarding
extra-EU agreements, we identify the main challenges for the EU in
concluding those agreements while simultaneously respecting the
principle of autonomy of the EU legal order above all in order to
safeguard the interpretive monopoly of the CJEU. In Section III, we
seek to focus on the relation between State-to-State arbitration and
investor-State adjudication in order to envisage an effective system of
coordination between these two mechanisms. As far as investor-State
arbitration is concerned, our reasoning counts for FTAs, such as
Singapore, which does not (at least so far) include an ICS, as well as
for other agreements, such as the TTIP, should the ICS not be
included in the final text (due to the Third Country partner’s
opposition or, less likely, to a changeover on the part of EU
institutions). As it will be shown, most of the analysis may apply also
26. See Caroline Simson, TTIP’s Investment Court System Likely to be Problematic,
LAW360, (Feb. 2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/763889/ttip-s-investment-courtsystem-likely-to-be-problematic.
27. See Fernanda G. Nicola, The Politicization of Legal Expertise in the TTIP
Negotiation, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 175 (2015).
28. See George A. Bermann, Navigating EU Law and the Law of International
Arbitration, 28 ARB. INT’L 397, 443-44 (2012).

1090 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:1081
to agreements containing ICS provisions. Finally, we address the
transformative potential of the permanent investment tribunals in
CETA 2016 and the EU-Vietnam FTA from both a procedural and
substantive perspective. The ICS demonstrates that the Commission
has challenged the status quo of the traditional ISDS regime to
institutionalize a permanent tribunal. From a procedural perspective
we welcome this new investment regime embodying the main criteria
of public law adjudication. Yet we question whether in substance the
ICS is equipped with necessary tools to engage with global
inequalities, sustainable devolvement and human rights violations
arising in the current international investment regime in a
transformative way.29
I. THE RATIONALE FOR KEEPING INVESTOR-STATE
ADJUDICATION IN EU FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
A. Risks of Politicization Arising from State-to-State Arbitration and
National Jurisdictions
The rationale for the inclusion of investor-State arbitration in the
form of ISDS30 in the free trade and investment agreements under
negotiation or conclusion by the EU31 lies in the need to ensure
impartiality and the de-politicization of disputes.32 The same holds
29. See UNCTAD INVESTMENT REPORT 2015, UNCTAD xi-xii (2015), http://unctad.org
/en/PublicationChapters/wir2015ch0_KeyMessage_en.pdf
(committing
to
sustainable
development and corporate social responsibility as a tradeoff to property protection).
30. See generally UNCTAD WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2015, UNCTAD (2015),
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf; ICSID 2015 ANNUAL REPORT,
ICSID (2015), https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/resources/Documents/ICSID_
AR15_ENG_CRA-highres.pdf (providing data and statistics on the proliferation of investment
dispute settlement systems). See, e.g., ANDREAS LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW 554-57 (2008); August Reinisch, The Proliferation of International Dispute Settlement
Mechanisms, The Threat of Fragmentation vs. the Promise of a More Effective System? Some
Reflections From the Perspective of Investment Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
BETWEEN UNIVERSALISM AND FRAGMENTATION: FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOUR OF GERHARD
HAFNER 107-25 (Isabelle Buffard, James Crawford, Alain Pellet, & Stephan Wittich, eds.,
2008) (identifying some of the main features of current investment dispute settlement
systems).
31. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
arts. 216-19, 2012 O.J. C 326/47, at 144-47 [hereinafter TFEU].
32. See Aron Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of Other States, in SELECTED ESSAYS: WORLD BANK, ICSID, AND
OTHER SUBJECTS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 194-96, 188-239 (1995)
(stressing that ICSID itself was conceived as a means of de-politicization). See also Ibrahim
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true, mutatis mutandis, for other systems of investor-State
adjudication, such as the ICS included in the 2015 TTIP Proposal, the
EU-Vietnam FTA and the CETA 2016. Indeed, if no provision is
made for this type of dispute-settlement mechanism,33 the only
avenues available to foreign investors wishing to sue the EU and/or
its Member States (and directly enforce their rights), as well as to
European investors wishing to sue the host partner State, will be
State-to-State arbitration34 and domestic judicial proceedings.35
“Domestic” means, as far as the EU is concerned, procedures both
before Member States’ national courts and the CJEU.36 In this respect,
it is too soon to assess with certainty what the new evolution on the
institution of an ICS, currently applied to two EU trade partners
(Canada and Vietnam, one developed country, one developing
country) may represent for agreements still under negotiation or
conclusion. Definitely, if confirmed in the future, it will represent a
radical twist that may be effective for the whole EU trade and
F.I. Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Role of ICSID
and MIGA, 1 ICSID R.––FOREIGN INV. L.J. 1 (1986); Sergio Puig, Emergence and Dynamism
in International Organizations: ICSID, Investor-State Arbitration and International
Investment Law, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 531 (2013). See Catharine Titi, Are Investment Tribunals
Adjudicating Political Disputes? Some Reflections on the Repoliticization of Investment
Disputes and (New) Forms of Diplomatic Protection, 32 J. INT’L ARB. 261, 262-67 (2015)
(giving an historical overview on the Convention, from the standpoint of de-politicization of
disputes). See generally Kaj Hober, Does Investment Arbitration Have a Future?, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: A HANDBOOK 1873-79 (Marc Bungenberg, Jörn Griebel,
Stephan Hobe, & August Reinisch eds., 2015) (writing on the future of investor-state
arbitration). On the limits of de-politicization see Martins Paparinskis, The Limits of Depoliticization in Contemporary Investor-State Arbitration, in SELECT PROCEEDINGS OF THE
EUROPEAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 271-84 (James Crawford & Sarah Nouwen
eds., 2010).
33. Moreover, while it is true that the rationale for investor-State arbitration lies in the
de-politicization of disputes, it is also true that all remedies have some contraindications; for
example, the danger of politicization may arise regardless of the system of conflict resolution
concerned, including investor-State arbitration.
34. See Free-trade agreements: A Better Way to Arbitrate, ECONOMIST (Oct. 11, 2014),
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21623674-protections-foreign-investors-are-nothorror-critics-claim-they-could-be-improved
(writing as one of the most influential supporters of State-to-State remedies in the context
of investment agreements).
35. See generally EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, DRAFT REPORT CONTAINING THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COMMISSION ON THE NEGOTIATIONS
FOR THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP (TTIP) (2014)
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE549.135+01+DOC+PDF+V0//EN (reporting in favor of this twofold solution (State-to-State
arbitration and domestic remedies)).
36. On this point see infra Section I.A.2.
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investment policy, including the TTIP. The following analysis had
been conceived, on the basis of the most relevant literature on
investment arbitration, and then carried out, in its core elements,
before the finalization of both the CETA 2016 and the EU-Vietnam
FTA; yet most of it, although being devoted originally to ISDS
mechanisms, applies also to the new ICS and thus includes several
references to such evolution throughout this article.
1. State-to-State Arbitration
Regarding State-to-State arbitration, the investor’s home State
has a discretionary right to protect its nationals by diplomatic means.
The State’s full discretion concerns the commencement, prosecution
and settlement of the claim, as well as the payment of damages,37 if
awarded by the arbitrators.38 A risk of politicization may thus arise
insofar as the State decides whether to initiate a dispute based on the
investor’s economic and political power (and his ability to persuade
and lobby the government in a more or less transparent manner)
rather than on the legal soundness of his claim.39 Diplomatic
protection, especially in the case of investment disputes, is apt to
create political and legal uncertainty and can be used in an arbitrary
fashion; therefore, it may impair the fairness and effectiveness of the
37. See Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), Judgment, P.C.I.J. A-2,
ICGJ 236 [1924], ¶ 12, (“. . . it is an elementary principle of international law that a State. . .
[b]y taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or
international judicial proceedings on his behalf . . . is in reality asserting its own rights – its
right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law.”).
38. See Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory
of Interdependent Rights and Shared Interpretive Authority, 55 HARV. INT’L L. J. 1, 2 (2015).
See generally Kate Parlett, Diplomatic Protection and Investment Arbitration, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM CLINICAL
ISOLATION TO SYSTEMIC INTEGRATION? 211-30 (Rainer Hofmann, & Christian J. Tams eds.,
2011); Peter Muchlinski, The Diplomatic Protection of Foreign Investors: a Tale of Judicial
Caution, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR
OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, 341-62 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009) (writing on diplomatic
protection and investment adjudication); Gary Born, A New Generation of International
Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J. 775 (2012); Susan D. Franck, The ICSID Effect? Considering
Potential Variations in Arbitration Awards, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 825 (2011); Ben Juratowitch,
The Relationship Between Diplomatic Protection and Investment Treaties, 23 ICSID REV.––
FOREIGN INV. L.J. 10 (2008).
39. See, e.g., Christoph Schreuer, Investment Protection and International Relations, in
THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS—LIBER AMICORUM HANSPETER NEUHOLD 345
(August Reinisch, & Ursula Kriebaum eds., 2007); Christoph Schreuer, Do We Need
Investment Arbitration?, TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT 1 (2014), https://www.transnationaldispute-management.com/article.asp?key=2026.
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system concerned. As emphasized by Joseph Weiler, “the bigger the
economic stake, the more powerful the multinational,” the more likely
investors “are to get the ear of a government which will espouse their
case.”40
If State-to-State arbitration is the only dispute resolution system
available, the risk of politicization can still also arise because a
government may be inclined (or disinclined) to take up the cause of
an investor due to the political and economic advantages (or
disadvantages) of bringing an international action against another
State – that is, due to the nature and importance of the political
interests that underpin its relationship with the State hosting the
investment. The espousal of a claim often depends on the interests of
the State rather than those of the investor, as observed by Michael
Reisman when he speaks of “the caprice of sovereign-to-sovereign
politics.”41 Moreover, national authorities may put pressure on
international arbitrators in order to avoid a “debacle,” which could
seriously damage the State’s international reputation.42 An additional
risk is that once a State-to-State dispute has been initiated, investors
will have no control over the proceedings started by their home State,
with the ultimate consequence of being left out of the process
altogether.43 Having said this, however, Section III will show that
State-to-State arbitration should not be abandoned as such, but rather
included in the EU’s international agreements along with investorState adjudication.44
2. National Jurisdictions
If domestic judicial proceedings are the only other course of
action available besides State-to-State arbitration, investors are forced

40. Joseph H. H. Weiler, European Hypocrisy: TTIP and ISDS, EJILTALK.ORG (Jan. 21,
2015), http://www.ejiltalk.org/european-hypocrisy-ttip-and-isds. See also Freya Baetens,
Transatlantic Investment Treaty Protection – A Response to Poulsen, Bonnitcha and Yackee 9
(Mar. 12, 2015), https://www.ceps.eu/publications/transatlantic-investment-treaty-protection%E2%80%93-response-poulsen-bonnitcha-and-yackee.
41. See Ecuador v. United States, Expert Opinion with Respect to Jurisdiction in the
Interstate Arbitration Initiated by Ecuador Against the United States, 20-21, ¶ 37 (Perm. Ct.
Arb., 2012).
42. See Weiler, supra note 40.
43. See Armand de Mestral, Investor-State Arbitration between Developed Democratic
Countries, CIGI 32 (Sept. 2015), https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/isa_
paper_series_no.1.pdf.
44. On this point, see infra Section III.A.
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to bring their claims solely before the courts of the host State.45 Thus,
there is a risk of politicization and partiality because domestic
jurisdictions may be induced to rule in favor of the host State in
response to national authorities wishing to avoid paying compensation
– and transferring State money – to foreign investors. Therefore, a
distinction could be made based on the reliability of a national court
depending on the country concerned. Indeed, the rationale for
investor-State adjudication seems less obvious in the case of
agreements between the EU and developed capital-exporting
countries than in that of EU agreements with developing countries –
which are generally also capital-importing countries.46 As noted in a
statement on investor-State arbitration in the TTIP submitted to the
European Commission by a group of academics (in the framework of
the public consultation launched on March 27, 2014 and concluded on
July 13, 2014, discussed above), it is difficult to argue investors in the
US-EU context have reason to worry in either region. Indeed,
investor-State arbitration, inserted in international agreements, was
traditionally aimed at attracting investments made in developing
countries with weak legal and judicial systems. In the case of bilateral
agreements between developed and developing countries, there has
always been a concern that the courts of a developing country may
fail to ensure the same degree of impartiality and fairness as is
expected of the judiciary in a developed democracy, thus making it
necessary to resort to an arbitral tribunal chosen by the parties and
called upon to apply procedural and substantive rules known in
advance to both parties.
As to the more problematic question of whether domestic courts
alone or with investor-State tribunals should settle disputes arising out
of trade and investment agreements between the EU and non-EU
developed countries, there seem to be at least three reasons for
keeping international adjudication (rather than traditional arbitration)
in this case. First, domestic proceedings can be lengthy, taking more
time than proceedings before investment tribunals, which contradicts
the aim of ensuring the speedy resolution of disputes.47
45. Yet, it might be that a clause on commercial arbitration is included in the contracts
negotiated by the investor.
46. However, countries such as China, albeit their status as a capital-exporting country,
are still considered developing States.
47. See European Federation for Investment Law and Arbitration (EFILA), A Response
to the Criticism against ISDS, 33 J. INT’L ARB. 1, 28 (2016) (noting that, although the average
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Secondly, from the point of view of foreign investors, it is not
certain that all of the EU’s Member States provide for internal
remedies allowing investors to challenge decisions by public
authorities. Moreover, as confirmed by a number of reports by
international organizations such as the World Economic Forum and
documents by EU institutions, not all judiciaries in the EU have been
exempt from strong criticism in relation to their quality,
independence, and efficiency.48 As a result, it is not surprising that
countries such as the United States greatly support the insertion of
investor-State arbitration in their agreements with the EU.49 As noted
in the literature, one may wonder why EU Member States have been
reluctant to abandon their BITs with new Member States formerly
part of the Communist Bloc if they esteem that their nationals will be
granted equal protection under EU law or under the laws of the new
Member States.50 Conversely, from the standpoint of the EU, the
omission of an investor-State adjudication system from the
agreements with third countries may entail serious consequences as
far as countries with weak judicial systems are concerned. For
instance, with respect to the TTIP, the UK House of Lords’ European
Union Committee, in its 14th Report of Session 2013–14, recognized
that their inclusion could add vital precedential value in advance of
similar agreements with nations like China.51 An alternative could be
to avoid inserting the system only in the agreements with developed,
Western democracies. Yet, this approach would be difficult to justify
vis-à-vis the developing countries with which the EU has already
negotiated agreements containing a provision on investor-State
adjudication. In any event, such an asymmetry could lead to
dangerous disparities since the judicial organs of the EU and Member
States would have jurisdiction over certain foreign investors but not

BIT arbitration takes three years, this is still faster than what it is needed to exhaust available
remedies in many developed national judicial systems).
48. See GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2015-2016, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM,
http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2015-2016/
(providing
data,
statistics and rankings on global investment disputes); see also EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE
2015
EU
JUSTICE
SCOREBOARD
(2015),
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effectivejustice/files/justice_scoreboard_2015_en.pdf.
49. See de Mestral, supra note 43, at 7-8 (giving insight on the NAFTA case law).
50. See id. at 7.
51. EU Committee Fourteenth Report: The Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership, Content of the TTIP, Ch. 3, ¶ 169 (2014), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/
pa/ld201314/ldselect/ldeucom/179/17906.htm#a42.
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others, with different treatment accorded to private parties on the
basis of their country of nationality.
Thirdly, rulings by different Member States’ national courts may
cause inconsistencies and result in a lack of legal certainty, putting
foreign investors at a disadvantage. In this regard, the problem with a
system based solely on domestic jurisdictions is that national courts
may have different approaches to a number of matters, such as the
recognition of the immunity of the host State, the interpretation of the
notion of property, the definition of “indirect expropriation” and the
scope and extent of compensation, in spite of the obligations arising
from customary law and Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR.52 In this
perspective, and with respect to the TTIP, the claim that the United
States would be willing to rely specifically on internal remedies and
conclude an agreement with the EU even without an investor-State
adjudication system (as was the case with their agreement with
Australia53) cannot be accepted per se precisely because of the
fundamental difference between a bilateral agreement with a third
State and an agreement with an international organization (and its
members), especially in the light of the problems arising from the
existence of a supranational court and the risks connected to the
diversity of court decisions among the 28 EU Member States.54
B. Lack of Direct Effect of EU Free Trade Agreements
Another important reason why a system of investor-State
adjudication seems to be of great importance for EU agreements is
that it offers investors remedies that may not otherwise be available,
at least under current EU law relating to the status of international
agreements in domestic legal systems. This issue can be better
understood by looking at the debate on the TTIP that took place
amongst the EU Member States, from which emerged that some
governments, including that of France, stressed the need to assign
domestic (i.e., national and EU) courts a stronger role than the one

52. See CHRISTOPH GRABENWARTER, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS:
COMMENTARY 359-71 (2014) (analyzing the ECtHR’s relevant case law on the provision).
53. See generally Austl.–U.S. Free Trade Agreement, May 18, 2004, A.T.S. 1
(AUSFTA).
54. This applies especially with regard to the different level of protection granted to
investors.
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envisaged in the text of CETA 201455 as reported by the Commission
in its Concept Paper of May 2015.56
1. Role of the CJEU
Typically, domestic courts could enforce jurisdiction mainly
through inclusion of either an explicit incentive for investors to bring
the matter before national courts or a mandatory rule of prior
exhaustion of local remedies in the agreement, according to which
individuals can bring a claim before international tribunals upon the
condition that they exhausted all domestic avenues of redress. An
alternative could be to give investors the right to choose between
bringing an action before a domestic court or, by virtue of an
investor-State dispute settlement clause, before an international
tribunal (the so-called “fork in the road”). A drastic solution would be
to exclude investor-State adjudication altogether, where consequently
only domestic judges would be competent to settle disputes between
the parties to the agreement.57
However, such a revaluation of the role of domestic
jurisdictions, no matter the intensity, would raise issues with regard to
the level of judicial effectiveness ensured by local remedies.
Specifically for the EU, the question is whether foreign investors
affected by Member States and/or EU measures could effectively
invoke the provisions of a free trade agreement (1) before the CJEU,
in order to challenge the legality of EU acts pursuant to Article 263(4)
TFEU,58 and/or (2) before national jurisdictions, in order to challenge
the validity of national law, to obtain an interpretation of EU law
under Article 267 TFEU or challenge its validity under the same
provision.59 While there is nothing preventing investors from having

55. CETA 2014 is the predecessor of CETA 2016, i.e. the agreement finalized by the EU
with Canada before the legal revision conducted by the Commission. The 2014 version of
CETA is available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf.
56. See Commission’s Concept Paper, supra note 10, para. IV.
57. As opposed to the mere possibility to do so, which is implicitly or explicitly
recognized by most BITs and FTAs, including the latest generation of agreements concluded
by the EU.
58. See TFEU, supra note 31, art. 263(4) (“Any natural or legal person may. . . institute
proceedings against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual
concern to them, and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not
entail implementing measures.”).
59. See TFEU, supra note 31, art. 267 (“. . . the Court of Justice of the European Union
shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: (a) the interpretation of the
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recourse to domestic courts per se, reflecting on “effectiveness”
means assessing whether the internal avenues offered by the MS as
well as by the EU would allow non-EU investors to effectively
enforce their rights. This implies determining whether an investor
may exercise his/her rights by relying directly on international law
provisions having a direct effect. If so, the individual would be
granted (in principle) access to a self-standing judicial remedy.
Consequently, the inclusion of an ISDS or ICS clause would not be
indispensable for an investor whose home State was a party to the
agreement concluded with the EU. If, on the contrary, no such
exercise was possible, the investor would have no access to direct
effective judicial remedies, with the result that it would be
inconvenient for him – in terms of duration and cost of litigation – to
bring the treaty-based claim first before a domestic court and then
before an international tribunal.
In the absence of a provision of primary or secondary law
establishing the types of effects of treaty obligations, it is up for the
CJEU to decide on the matter. In its earlier case law, the CJEU,
opting for a monist interpretation of the relationship between
international law and the EU legal order, allowed private parties to
invoke international law provisions that were sufficiently precise and
unconditional.60 However, a brief analysis of the CJEU recent case
law on the status of international agreements in the EU legal order is
sufficient to show that the Court tends to deny, in concrete terms, the
direct effect of the provisions contained in such agreements, thus
excluding the possibility for natural and legal persons to invoke them
before the CJEU.61 The Court62 has confirmed this approach in its
Treaties; (b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or
agencies of the Union.”).
60. See Haegeman v. Belgium, 181/73, [1974] E.C.R 449, ¶ 2–6; Hauptzollamt Mainz v.
C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A, 104/81, [1982] E.C.R ¶ 20 (identifying what are the
conditions that international law provisions must fulfill for being invoked by individuals).
61. See, e.g., Portugal v. Council, Case C-149/96, Portuguese Republic v. Council,
[1999] E.C.R. I-08395; Van Parys NV v. Belgisch Interventie- en Restitutiebureau (BIRB),
Case C-377/02, [2005] E.C.R. I-1465; Fabbrica Italiana Accumulatori Motocarri Montecchio
SpA v. Council, FIAMM Joined Cases C-120/06P & C-121/06P, [2008] E.C.R. I-6513;
Monsanto Technology LLC Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 6 July 2010, Case C428/0, 2010 I-06765 (involving WTO law). See generally Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al
Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the
European Communities, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, [2008] I-06351 [2008]
E.C.L.I. 461; Commission of the European Communities v. Ireland, Case C-459/03, [2006] I04635; The Queen, on the application of International Association of Independent Tanker
Owners (Intertanko) and Others v. Secretary of State for Transport, Case C-308/06, [2008] I-
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Stichting Natuur en Milieu judgment,63 concerning the 1998 Aarhus
Convention,64 where a Commission Decision authorizing The
Netherlands to postpone the introduction of certain EU clean air
requirements was challenged by an NGO. The application, considered
well founded by the General Court (GC), was finally dismissed by the
European Court of Justice (ECJ). The EU judges remarked that,
according to settled case law, the provisions of an international
agreement to which the EU is a party can be relied on in support of an
action for annulment of an act of secondary EU legislation only where
the nature and broad logic of that agreement do not preclude it, and
those provisions appear to be unconditional and sufficiently precise.65
04057; Commune de Mesquer v. Total France SA and Total International Ltd., Case C-188/07,
[2008] I-04501 (involving international law outside the WTO).
62. See generally Jacques Bourgeois, The European Court of Justice and the WTO, in
THE EU, THE WTO, AND THE NAFTA 71-124 (Joseph H. H. ed., 2000); Christina Eckes, The
European Court of Justice and (quasi)judicial bodies of international law, in BETWEEN
AUTONOMY AND DEPENDENCE: THE EU LEGAL ORDER UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 85–109 (Ramses A. Wessel, & Steven Blockmans eds.,
2013); Piet Eeckhout, EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW 323-436 (2011); INTERNATIONAL LAW
AS LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (Enzo Cannizzaro, Paolo Palchetti, & Ramses A. Wessel
eds., 2011); Pieter Jan Kuijper, ‘It Shall Contribute to . . . the Strict Observance and
Development of International Law’, in THE COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
EUROPE: ANALYSES AND PERSPECTIVES ON SIXTY YEARS OF CASE LAW 589–612, 597–601
(2013); Mario Mendez, THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF EU AGREEMENTS (2013); Allan Rosas, The
European Court of Justice and Public International Law, in THE EUROPEANISATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW – THE STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE EU AND ITS MEMBER
STATES 71-85 (Jan Wouters, André Nollkaemper, & Erika de Wet eds., 2008); Marco
Bronckers, From “Direct Effect” to “Muted Dialogue”: Recent Developments in the
European Courts’ Case-law on the WTO and Beyond, J. INT’L ECON. L. 885 (2008); Marco
Bronckers, The Effect of the WTO in European Court Litigation, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 443
(2005); John Errico, The WTO in the EU: Unwinding the Knot, CORNELL INT’L L.J. 179
(2011); Nikolaos Lavranos, Protecting European law from international law, EUR. FOREIGN
AFF. REV. 265 (2010); Anna Peters, The Position of International Law Within the European
Community Legal Order, GR. Y.B INT’L L. 9 (1997); Gráinne de Búrca, The European Court
of Justice and the International Legal Order After Kadi, (The Jean Monnet Ctr. Working Paper
No. 01/09, 2009), http://jeanmonnetprogram.org/paper/the-european-court-of-justice-and-theinternational-legal-order-after-kadi/; Christina Eckes, International Law as Law of the EU:
The Role of the ECJ, (Cleer Working Paper, June 2010), http://www.asser.nl/media/
1622/clee10-6web.pdf; Gráinne de Búrca, International Law Before the Courts: The European
Union and the United States Compared, (NYU Sch. L., Pub. L. & Legal Theory, Working
Paper No. 14-61, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2487361
(discussing the legal effects of international law in the EU legal order).
63. See Council and Commission v. Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Pesticide Action
Network Europe, Joined Cases C-404/12 P and C-405/12 P, [2015] E.C.L.I. 5.
64. See generally UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, UN Doc. ECE/CEP/43 (Oct.
30, 2001).
65. See Stichting Natuur en Milieu, supra note 63, at ¶ 53.
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Most importantly, the Court observed that Article 9(3) of the Aarhus
Convention does not contain any unconditional and sufficiently
precise obligations capable of directly regulating the legal position of
individuals.66 The Court, in relation to bilateral trade treaties, instead,
recognized, at least in theory, to private parties the right to directly
invoke those agreements;67 however, this recognition has been
contradicted by the normative choices made by EU negotiators with
their third countries’ counterparts in the CETA 2016, the EU-Vietnam
FTA, as well as in the 2015 TTIP Proposal. The same holds true for
those FTAs that have been already concluded, are now in force and
do not include investment chapters. All these agreements have a
clause which leaves no room for doubt.68
For instance, Article 8 of the Council decision on the FTA with
Korea reads: “[T]he agreement shall not be construed as conferring
rights or imposing obligations which can be directly invoked before
Union or Member State courts and tribunal.”69 The draft FTA with
Vietnam provisional Article X.19, entitled “No Direct Effect”,
Chapter XX, provides that “nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed as conferring rights or imposing obligations on persons,
other than those created between the Parties under public international
law.” Furthermore, Article 30(6) of CETA 2016, which mirrors
Article 14(16) of CETA 2014, states that “nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed…as permitting this Agreement to be directly
invoked in the domestic legal systems of the Parties,” where the
expression “domestic legal systems” is to be understood as

66. See Stichting Natuur en Milieu, supra note 63, at ¶¶ 46-47.
67. See e.g., Igor Simutenkov v. Ministerio de Educación y Cultura and Real Federación
Española de Fútbol, Case C-265/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-02579, ¶¶ 20-29.
68. See generally EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement; EU-Colombia Free Trade
Agreement; EU-Peru Free Trade Agreement, EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement; EU-Viet.
Free Trade Agreement, supra note 3; CETA, supra note 3. See Aliki Semertzi, The preclusion
of direct effect in the recently concluded EU free trade agreements, COMMON MKT. L. REV.
1125 (2014) (providing an interesting survey of agreements).
69. Council Decision, 2011/265/EU (on the signing, on behalf of the European Union,
and provisional application of the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its
Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part), art. 8, 2011 O.J.
2011, L 127/1. The FTA with Singapore reads: “For greater certainty, nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed as conferring rights or imposing obligations on persons, other
than those created between the Parties under public international law”. See Free Trade
Agreement, EU-Sing., art. 17.15, authentic text as of May 2015 (pending formal approval by
the European Commission, Council of Ministers, and ratification by the European Parliament).
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comprising both national and EU legal orders.70 Moreover, on one
hand, the CJEU affirmed that if the Parties decided to define in the
agreement the scope of the rights and obligations arising from the
treaty, the Court itself will abide by that choice.71 On the other hand,
it made clear that international agreements are self-executing “only
where the nature and the broad logic of the latter do not preclude
this.”72 The above-mentioned clause prevents investors from directly
invoking the treaties, not only before Member States’ courts but also
before the CJEU. From this, it follows that FTAs will get the same
treatment, mutatis mutandis, as that accorded by the CJEU to WTO
law.73
2. Effective Judicial Protection
The lack of direct effect of FTAs clearly represents an obstacle
to ensure an effective system of judicial protection of individual
rights.74 In fact, denying access to domestic courts blunts the impact
of such agreements on daily life, reducing the courts’ efficacy and
leaving their potential unrealized. The effectiveness of EU law itself
has been ensured over the years only through the CJEU’s recognition
of direct effect – combined with the application of the principle of
supremacy – and its qualification as a matter of both human rights and
70. Even though Article 30(6) does not expressly identify the judicial bodies concerned,
in contrast with the text contained in other FTAs. See Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement (CETA), Can.-E.U., art. 30.6, draft finalized Sept. 2014 (Pending internal approval
process in Canada and the European Union), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014
/september/tradoc_152806.pdf.
71. See Air Transport Association of America & Others v. Secretary of State for Energy
and Climate Change, Case C-366/10, [2011] E.C.R. I-13755, ¶ 49 (noting that “European
Union institutions which have power to negotiate and conclude an international agreement are
free to agree with the third States concerned what effect the provisions of the agreement are to
have in the internal legal order of the contracting parties”).
72. See Intertanko and Others, Case C-308/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-4057, ¶ 45.
73. See Antonello Tancredi, On the Absence of Direct Effect of the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body’s Decisions in the EU Legal Order, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE
EU, supra note 62, at 249-68.
74. See Marise Cremona, Guest Editorial, Negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP), 31 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 354-62 (2015); Marco Bronckers,
Is Investor–State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Superior to Litigation Before Domestic Courts?
An EU View on Bilateral Trade Agreements, 18 J. INT’L ECON. L. 655, 662-64, 674-76 (2015)
[hereinafter Is Investor-State Dispute Settlement]; Daniel Thym, The Missing Link: Direct
Effect, CETA/TTIP and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, EU L. ANALYSIS (Jan. 7, 2015)
(observing that the denial of direct effect of a free trade and investment agreement constitutes
a “stumbling block” for its long-term success), http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.it/2015/01/themissing-link-direct-effect-cetattip.html; see also TTIP Consultation, supra note 4.
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market integration.75 Therefore, an investor-State adjudication
mechanism seems to be necessary, at least as long as the approach of
the EU to the incorporation of international law in the EU system
remains unchanged (i.e., as long as this mechanism is the only one
currently capable of providing a direct procedural remedy to foreign
investors).
The other possible option is to recognize the indirect effect of
international agreements, but it does not seem to be the best
alternative. In other words, the issue is whether that recognition,
through the principle of consistent interpretation, could adequately
protect the interests and rights of investors claiming to be the victim
of a violation by EU or national authorities.76 According to said
principle, both national courts and the CJEU must interpret the law in
a manner consistent with the agreement itself, which operates as a
parameter of legitimacy in the EU legal order, within the limits of the
established case law.77 The problem with consistent interpretation is
that it confers so much discretion on domestic courts that uniformity
and legal certainty may be endangered at the expense of foreign
investors, especially given the existence of 28 different jurisdictions.
Furthermore, it does not seem a satisfactory path as the requirements
75. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Transformative Transatlantic Free Trade Agreements
without Rights and Remedies of Citizens?, 18 J. INT’L ECON. L., 579, 583-84, 594 (2015)
(remarking on the human rights dimension implied in the legal discourse on direct effect of
free trade and investment agreements); see Is Investor-State Dispute Settlement, supra note 74,
at 675 (commenting on the market integration dimension of direct effect recognition).
76. See generally Federico Casolari, International Law within the EU Legal Order: The
Doctrine of Consistent Interpretation, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE EU, supra
note 62, at 395-415; Gaetano Iorio Fiorelli, WTO as a parameter for the EC legislation
through the “consistent interpretation” doctrine, in THE ABSENCE OF DIRECT EFFECT OF WTO
IN THE EC AND IN OTHER COUNTRIES 121-33 (Claudio Dordi, ed., 2010); Giacomo Gattinara,
Consistent Interpretation of WTO Rulings in the EU Legal Order?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
AS LAW OF THE EU, supra note 62, at 269-87; Gerrit Betlem & André Nollkaemper, Giving
Effect to Public International Law and European Community Law before Domestic Courts. A
Comparative Analysis of the Practice of Consistent Interpretation, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L., 569
(2003); Jan-Peter Hix, Indirect Effect of International Agreement: Consistent Interpretation
and Other Forms of Judicial Accommodation of WTO Law by the EU Courts and US Courts,
(Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 03/13, 2013), http://jeanmonnetprogram.org/paper/indirecteffect-of-international-agreements-consistent-interpretation-and-other-forms-of-judicialaccommodation-of-wto-law-by-the-eu-courts-and-the-us-courts-2/
(giving
general
considerations concerning the doctrine of consistent interpretation, as applied by the CJEU to
international law).
77. See, e.g., Interfood GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Ericus, Case C-92/71, [1972]
E.C.R. 231; Hauptzollamt Mainz v. CA Kupferberg & Cie KG, Case C-104/81, [1982] E.C.R.
3644; Fediol v. Commission, Case C-70/87, [1989] E.C.R. 1825; Nakajima v Council, Case C69/89, [1991] E.C.R. I-2169.
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for indirect effect are only slightly more relaxed than those for direct
effect. In any event, it is beyond doubt that by relying on the indirect
effect of international agreements’ provisions, such as a reading of
EU legislation that cannot be per se contra legem, an individual does
not seek to challenge the legality of a domestic measure but merely
wants to have that provision interpreted in a favorable way.78 This
means that, while not unimportant, the impact of such an action is
limited79 in scope.80
In light of the foregoing, one may conclude that FTAs that
contain a clause on the preclusion of direct effect, but no provision on
investor-State adjudication, are a step back in terms of protection of
individual rights. At present, a system of investor-State dispute
settlement – even though “external” to the EU legal order as well as
to national ones – appears to be the only solution to ensure an
advanced form of judicial protection to investors. Having said this,
the situation would certainly be different where the agreement
contains no clause precluding direct effect, and consequentially
private enforcement before domestic courts is possible. In this
respect, what the EU should do is depart from its current approach
and give domestic courts (the CJEU and national judges) the power to
adjudicate claims submitted by private parties. On one hand, FTAs
should not preclude the direct effect of the provisions they contain.
On the other hand, the CJEU should take action since it is responsible
for deciding whether to recognize direct effect and, as stated in the
Kupferberg case, the existence of an institutional framework for
settling disputes between the parties to an agreement “is not in itself
sufficient to exclude all judicial application of that agreement.”81

78. See, e.g., Federico Casolari, L’INCORPORAZIONE DEL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE
NELL’ORDINAMENTO DELL’UNIONE EUROPEA, 336-350, 345-346 (2008) (It.).
79. See Is Investor–State Dispute Settlement, supra note 74, at 665.
80. It is limited in scope – with different conditions and objectives – also Article 340
TFEU, in that it confers upon investors the right to right to rely on such provision to ask for
compensation damages for wrongful behaviour on the part of EU institutions; see on this point
Francesco Munari, Chiara Cellerino, General Principles of EU law and international
investment arbitration, in DIRITTO DEL COMMERCIO INTERNAZIONALE, 2015, 115, at 136
(examining the potential of Article 340 TFEU).
81. See Hauptzollamt Mainz v. CA Kapferberg and Cie KG, C-104/81, [1982] E.C.R.
3664, ¶ 20; see also Beatrice Bonafé, Direct Effect of International Agreements in the EU
Legal Order: Does it Depend on the Existence of an International Dispute Settlement
Mechanism?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE EU, supra note 62, 229-48 (explaining
the interplay between direct effect and the existence of a court in international agreements).
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Regarding the case of agreements concluded with partners of the
EU, whose legal systems do not provide for self-executing rights
deriving from international law provisions, the recognition of direct
effect by the EU and Member States would arguably create an
asymmetry between the parties to the agreement and might be
unprofitable for both European and national institutions. This
argument first does not fully take into account the case law of the
CJEU, in which the Court observes that such divergence “is not in
itself such as to constitute a lack of reciprocity in the implementation
of the agreement.”82 Secondly, it does not address the key role of the
protection of justiciable fundamental rights, to which the principle of
reciprocity does not apply.83
In any event, should FTAs be granted direct effect in the future,
the rule of prior exhaustion of local remedies may apply in principle.
While this rule, as previously noted, cannot produce any effet utile if
and when direct effect is excluded, its recognition would allow
private parties to effectively bring their claims first before domestic
courts, so that if unsuccessful, they may later have recourse to
investor-State tribunals. However, this cannot obscure the fact that
additional problems attached to the involvement of national courts
still remain. As underlined above, they concern the fragmentation of
rulings caused by the 28 jurisdictions, as well as the different level of
investment protection (at both procedural and substantive levels)
ensured by national courts. It is beyond doubt that in order to secure
an effective system of investment disputes settlement, Member States
and the EU should find a way to reduce the obstacles implied in many
national judicial systems as much as possible. A substantial
homogeneity and adequate protection of investor’s rights might be
guaranteed by the involvement of the CJEU should the investor be
dissatisfied with rulings delivered by a court of a Member State and
the national court be inclined (or obliged) to request the Court to give
a ruling, in accordance with Article 267 TFEU.

82. See CA Kapferberg and Cie KG, [1982] E.C.R. 3664, ¶ 18.
83. See Is Investor-State Dispute Settlement, supra note 74, at 672, 675.
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II. DANGEROUS LIAISONS BETWEEN INVESTOR-STATE
ADJUDICATION AND THE CJEU: THE PRINCIPLE OF
AUTONOMY OF EU LAW UNDER ATTACK
A. Inevitable Clashes for Intra-EU BITs
Conflict of laws has been a challenging subject for the EU and
its Member States starting with the drafting of the 1968 Brussels
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters.84 With the entry into force of the
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, the EU has attempted to resolve the
controversies in private international law conventions by undertaking
the “communitarization” of private international law.85 In addition,
the Amsterdam Treaty gave the European Parliament powers to veto
and regulate other commercial treaties, and adjust them toward
applicable EU law. Despite these efforts, it has turned into complex
jurisdictional clashes between two different international legal
regimes in what George Bermann called the “distant worlds of EU
and international arbitration law.”86
If international commercial treaties have been reconciled with
EU law norms, in contrast the clash between Bilateral Investment
Treaties (BITs) and EU law has been dramatic. The Treaty of Lisbon
aimed to reconcile some of these differences through article 351(2)
TFEU requiring Member States to take any “appropriate steps to
eliminate the incompatibilities established” in international treaties
incompatible with EU law. This provision, however, has been of
limited usefulness in the clashes between BITs signed either among
Member States of the EU (Intra-EU BITs) 87 or between a Member

84. See Vera Fritz, Tessili vs. Dunlop 1976: The Political Background of Judicial
Restraint (in BILL DAVIES AND FERNANDA NICOLA EDS., EU LAW STORIES: CONTEXTUAL
AND CRITICAL HISTORIES OF EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENCE (2016 forthcoming) (on file with
author).
85. See Fausto Pocar, The “Communitarization” of Private International Law and its
Impact on the External Relations of the European Union, in THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF
EC PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN FAMILY AND SUCCESSION MATERS 3-15 (Alberto
Malatesta, Stafania Bariatti & Fausto Pocar eds., 2008).
86. See George Bermann, supra note 28, at 400.
87. See Konstanze von Papp, Solving Conflicts with International Investment Treaty Law
from an EU Law Perspective: Article 351 TFEU Revisited, 42 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON.
INTEGRATION 325 (2015), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2726550 (“It will be
argued that the current reading of Article 351 TFEU is of limited usefulness, since it is overly
restrictive and ultimately concerned with fostering EU supremacy in external relations.”).
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State and a non-EU State (Extra EU-BITs).88 This part focuses on the
intra-BITs that create an obvious challenge to the EU legal order
especially due to the fact that a number of them were agreed around
the 1990s, well before the EU enlargement of 2004. Therefore, many
BITs were concluded between the wealthy existing EU Member
States whose investors wanted to be reassured before investing in the
former Eastern European States eventually known as the “EU 13”
block. By 2014, when the EU 13 countries had all become EU
members, the Intra-EU BITs were not eliminated but rather kept as
guarantees of protection from expropriation without compensation
and arbitration procedures.
As a result, the Commission has through infringement
proceedings asked Member States to terminate existing Intra-EU BITs
that are contrary to EU law.89 Paradoxically, today European investors
might want to maintain their benefits under BITs because the
independence of the judiciary in both Hungary and Poland is at risk in
these Member States.90 However, the fact that BITs confer rights only
to investors from some Member states and not others creates a
discrimination based on nationality that is incompatible with EU law
and reinstated by CJEU case law. Yet it is hard to adapt ISDS clauses
because international investment arbitration includes other
organizations such as the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (“ICSID”). The ICSID convention plays an
important role in the inflexibility of the BITs to adapt to EU law. For
example, in terms of jurisdiction, the ICSID convention allows the
arbitral tribunal to assert final jurisdiction over a dispute, which
creates a major irritant for EU law and the potential conflict with
CJEU jurisprudence.91 Even though there may be some conflicts in
the interpretation of BITs and EU law by arbitrators in an investor88. See Bermann, supra note 28, at 440.
89. See
Commission
Press
Release,
IP/15/5198
(Jun.
18,
2015),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5198_en.htm.
90. See Commission, Fact Sheet, College Orientation Debate on recent developments in
Poland and the Rule of Law Framework: Questions & Answers, (Jan. 13, 2016),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-62_it.htm; Kim Scheppele, EU Commission v.
Hungary: The Case for the Systemic Infringement Action, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Nov. 22,
2013),
http://verfassungsblog.de/eu-commission-v-hungary-the-case-for-the-systemicinfringement-action/; Wojciech Sadurski, What Makes Kaczynski Tick?, I-CONNECT (Jan. 14,
2016),
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2016/01/what-makes-kaczynski-tick/?utm_source=
feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+I-CONnectBlog+%28ICONnect+Blog%29.
91. See Bermann, supra note 28, at 439.
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State dispute, under the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999 the Commission
has the power to halt the enforcement of the final award.
According to George Bermann, another major reason often
invoked by the Commission for non-enforcement of arbitral awards is
public policy. This argument gained momentum in the case Eco Swiss
China Time Ltd v. Benetton International NV.92 In Eco Swiss,
Benetton licensed a Hong Kong company (Eco Swiss) to manufacture
watches using the slogan “Benetton by Bulova.”93 The agreement
contained a limitation that “Eco Swiss could not sell the products in
Italy.”94 The European Commission was not given notification of the
agreement nor its special marketing scheme, and therefore the
agreement was in violation of EU competition law.95 Eco Swiss sued
Benetton for damages. In application of the arbitration clause, an
arbitral tribunal was formed under the laws of the Netherlands
Institute of Arbitration and the substantive matter was judged in
application of Dutch Law.96 The tribunal held Benetton liable for the
breach of the licensing agreement and ordered the payment of
damages. The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”), however, voided
the enforcement of the award stating that the award was issued in
violation of EU anti-competition laws and that the enforcement of the
award would be against public policy.97
While the Commission has used Eco Swiss to assert that “EU
competition policy does indeed constitute EU public policy,” the EU
prohibition of State aids has become another major claim of nonenforcement of arbitral awards with mixed outcomes.98 As a result EU
law has determined that a Member State cannot provide State aid to
an investor unless the Commission has previously approved the aid
under its guidelines. This is a key issue when it comes to the clash
between EU law and BITs; the Micula Brothers case has become the

92. The EU Commission, based on public policy, set aside the award stating that the
enforcement of the award would be considered a blunt violation of EU Law and ant
competition laws. See Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton International NV, Case C126/97, [1999] E.C.R. 3055.
93. See Bermann, supra note 28, at 411.
94. Id. at 411.
95. Contrary to Article 101 TFEU prohibits agreements between undertakings and
concerted practices that might prevent or distort competition in the Member States.
96. See Bermann, supra note 28, at 412.
97. See id. at 413.
98. Id.
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paradigmatic example of a clash between two distinct bodies of law
resulting in a complex litigation before ICSID.
1. The Micula Brothers Case
The Micula Brothers case has become a landmark ICSID
decision that shows the clashes of two worlds due to an intra-EU BIT
agreement and the prohibition of state aids in EU law. In 1988, the
Romanian government enacted the “Emergency Government
Ordinance” (“EGO 24”). This statute allowed some tax exemptions to
investors, such as custom duty exemptions and other tax incentives
(“incentives”).99
Capitalizing on the incentives, the Micula brothers commenced
various investments in Romania.100 In April 2003, Sweden and
Romania signed a BIT.101 Under the BIT, the signatory States would
(1) require each contracting party to ensure fair and equitable
treatment of the investments by investors of the other contracting
party (“FET clause”),102 and (2) observe any other obligation entered
into by the State with an investor of the other contracting party with
regard to their investment (“umbrella clause”).103 In 2007, Romania
discontinued these incentives as part of a condition to join the
European Union. The termination of the incentives by the Romanian
government was the cause of action to file BIT arbitration by the
investors. Meanwhile the brothers, Ioan and Viorel Micula, acquired
Swedish citizenship, which allowed them to file a complaint under the
BIT claiming unfair treatment to a foreign investor.104
99. See Nikos Lavranos, Interference of the European Commission in the Enforcement of
Arbitration Awards: The Micula Case, GLOBAL INVESTMENT PROTECTION (May 5, 2014),
http://www.globalinvestmentprotection.com/index.php/interference-of-the-europeancommission-in-the-enforcement-of-arbitration-awards-the-micula-case/ (“. . . the incentives
included subsides, tax breaks and custom duty exceptions for investors on machinery and raw
materials”).
100. They opened the following companies: European Food SA, Starmill SRL, and
Multipack SRL. Micula v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Final Award, ¶ 4 (Dec. 11
2013).
101. Bilateral Investment Treat between the Government of Romania and the
Government of the Kingdom of Sweden. Date of BIT signature 05/29/2002; Date of entry into
force 04/01/2003.
102. Sveriges Internationaella Overenskommelser, art. 3(2), [SO 2003:2], at 4-5.
103. See Micula, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Final Award at ¶ 342.
104. See id. at 3. The Swedish citizenship allowed the Micula brothers to file a complaint
against Romania under the FET clause (Article 3.2) because the clause protects foreign
investors in the host country. Had they not acquired Swedish citizenship, the Micula Brothers
could not have sued Romania under the BIT.
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Once litigation started, Romania challenged the jurisdiction of
ICSID. However, on September 24, 2008 the arbitral panel
(“Tribunal”) rejected this contention and ratified its jurisdiction to
solve the dispute.105 On the merits, the Micula brothers alleged that
they made investments “in one of the poorest and least developed
regions of Romania” with the expectation that the incentives would
remain in place for ten years, and the legal change harmed their
investment-backed expectation.106 Further, claimants argued that
Romania failed to inform the investors that the incentives, particularly
the raw materials incentive, would have to be reversed.107 This harm
to the expectations, as claimed by the Micula brothers, amounted to
an expropriation without compensation.108 Also, they argued that
Romania breached the BIT when it failed to provide FET when it
ceased the incentives.109 Finally, they alleged the BIT was not
contrary to EU law because under article 9(2) of the BIT, the
Investment Treaty would prevail in case of a conflict of laws.110
Romania, on the other hand, argued that the claimants did not rely on
the incentives to make their investments, or if they did, that reliance
was unreasonable.111 Romania also contended that the changes in the
incentive regime did not violate the BIT as its actions were
reasonably related to a rational policy, namely EU accession.112 If the
BIT were found to be incompatible with EU law, the latter would
prevail on the basis of the principle lex specialis derogat legi

105. See Micula, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Final Award at ¶¶ 284-85.
106. See id. at ¶¶ 1, 252 (“The Claimants claim that, in reliance on those incentives, and
in reliance on the expectation that these incentives would be maintained during a 10-year
period, they made substantial investments in the Ştei-Nucet-Drăgăneşti disfavored region
located in Bihor County in northwestern Romania.”).
107. See Nikos Lavranos, Interference of the European Commission in the Enforcement
of Arbitration Awards: The Micula v. Romania Case, GLOBAL INVESTMENT PROTECTION
(Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.globalinvestmentprotection.com/index.php/interference-of-theeuropean-commission-in-the-enforcement-of-arbitration-awards-the-micula-case/
(acknowledging that “some Romanian regional authorities continued to reassure the investors
that these Incentives would be safeguarded, while other parts of the government, who were
negotiating with the European Commission (EC) on the accession, became convinced that it
would have to be dropped.”).
108. Micula, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Final Award at ¶¶ 256, 270.
109. Id. at ¶ 257.
110. Id. at ¶ 294. In relying on the preservation of rights provision the claimants added
that, even if under EU law Romania was obliged to phase out the Incentives, this would not
excuse Romania’s alleged breaches of the BIT and international law.
111. Micula, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Final Award at ¶ 132.
112. Id.
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generali.113 Romania also asserted that Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna
Convention would require that the BIT be interpreted in light of EU
Law, eliminating conflicting obligations.114 Further, Romania
prompted the tribunal to take into account the wider juridical context
in which the BIT between Romania and Sweden was negotiated and
concluded.115 The conclusion of the BIT was a direct consequence of
the European Union Association Agreement in the context of
Romania’s accession to the EU.116
The Tribunal rejected the contention made by Romania and
considered that the BIT and the EU law are not in conflict and
therefore the BIT should be applied as an independent body of law.117
The Tribunal asserted that EU law seemed to be part of the general
scheme of applicable laws to this dispute.118 The Tribunal held that
Romania had breached its obligation of providing a FET to the
Micula Brothers under the BIT.119 They set forth a test to consider if
Romania failed to provide FET, analyzing if (a) the State had made a
promise or assurance, (b) the claimants relied on that promise or
assurance as a matter of fact, and (c) such reliance was reasonable.120
The Tribunal found that: (a) Romania made specific promises to the
claimants in regards to the incentives and their duration; (b)
Romania’s conduct had induced the claimants to believe that the
incentives would not be taken; and (c) it was reasonable for the
Micula Brothers to believe that the incentives were legal under
Romanian law.121
113. “Special law repeals general laws.” Id. at ¶ 310.
114. Id. at ¶ 305.
115. Micula, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Final Award at ¶ 304.
116. See id. at ¶ 308 (“In view of the above, the Respondent contends that all substantive
obligations contained in the BIT must be interpreted in a manner consistent with EU law. This
includes in particular Article 64 of the Europe Agreement and Article 87 of the EC Treaty.”).
117. See id. at ¶ 319 (“As a first step, the Tribunal notes that there is no real conflict of
treaties. In the time period relevant to this dispute, the relevant rules of international law
applicable to Romania and Sweden were the Europe Agreement (which entered into force on 1
February 1995) and the BIT (which entered into force on 1 April 2003). The Accession Treaty
was not signed until 25 April 2005, and entered into force on 1 January 2007, date on which
the EC Treaty also entered into force with respect to Romania.”).
118. Id. at ¶ 317.
119. This was held by the majority of the arbitrators: Laurent Lévy and Stanimir
Alexandrov. However, the Tribunal did not find a regulatory taking in this case. See Micula v.
Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Separate Opinion of Georges Abi-Saab, ¶ 13
(disagreeing that Romania’s lack of transparency amounted to a breach of FET).
120. Micula, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Final Award at ¶¶ 608, 668.
121. Id. at ¶¶ 677, 703, 721.
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The Tribunal held that the BIT and the applicable EU laws were
not in conflict since there was not reasonable foreseeability that
Romania’s accession to the EU would change any provision to the
already-negotiated BIT.122 In cases of doubt of the application and
finality of the BIT, the tribunal stated that it must consider the
application of the BIT in the light most favorable to the investors.123
The main reason it held that Romania’s accession to the EU did not
change the BIT was that Romania maintained certain provisions of
EGO 24 that were not under EU pressure to change.124 Also, the
majority of the arbitrators (Laurent Lévy and Stanimir Alexandrov)
held that EGO 24 was still applicable since the BIT did not provide a
definition of FET of investors.125 The Tribunal held that even though
legislation is constantly evolving, the nation has to strive to protect
the legitimate interest of its investors by acting in a procedurally
proper manner.126 Failure to comply with these guidelines would
result in the nation’s international liability. The monetary award
amounted to $250 million.127
In 2015, via a decision addressed to Romania, the Commission
ordered a halt on payment to the investors since the award was

122. See id. at ¶ 321 (stating that “the Tribunal notes that the BIT does not contain any
reference to EU accession or to the EU. Further, the Accession Treaty did not contain any
references to the BIT, let alone seek to modify any of the BIT’s provisions”).
123. The Tribunal took this approach based on Saluka Investments BV (Netherlands) v.
Czech Republic. See Micula v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, at ¶ 504; see generally
Saluka Investments BV (Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, IIC 210, Partial Award (Mar. 17,
2006), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0740.pdf.
124. See Chiristian Leathely and Alejandro Garcia, Breach of fair and equitable
treatment standard (ICSID), ARBITRATION NOTES (Jan. 16, 2014, 4:41 PM),
http://hsfnotes.com/arbitration/2014/01/16/breach-of-fair-and-equitable-treatment-standardicsid/ (“The tribunal reasoned that the existence of an ‘obligation’ should be determined
according to ‘governing law’, in this case, Romanian law.”).
125. See id. at ¶ 446.
126. See Micula v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, at ¶ 529 (“In the Tribunal’s
view, the correct position is that the state may always change its legislation, being aware and
thus taking into consideration that: (i) an investor’s legitimate expectations must be protected;
(ii) the state’s conduct must be substantively proper (e.g., not arbitrary or discriminatory); and
(iii) the state’s conduct must be procedurally proper (e.g., in compliance with due process and
fair administration). If a change in legislation fails to meet these requirements, while the
legislation may be validly amended as a matter of domestic law, the state may incur
international liability.”).
127. See Micula v. Romania, 2015 O.J. (L 232) 69, ¶ 27 (“The Tribunal further decided
that Romania has to pay damages to the claimants. In total, the Tribunal awarded the claimants
RON 376,433,229 plus interest.”).
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incompatible with EU State aid rules.128 The principal reason for
ordering the payment stop was that such payment would be
considered illegal State aid since the Micula brothers would receive
compensation in the same amount of the benefits.129 Therefore these
benefits are in direct violation of the EU State aid rules. The role of
EU law with respect to intra-EU BITs remains, however, a disputed
issue as to which arbitral tribunals held certain views; if the Micula
Brothers tribunal suggested that EU law would be part of the factual
background to the case, by contrast, in Electrabel SA v. Hungary, the
arbitral tribunal considered EU law to be applicable law.130 There are
a number of pending cases in which this is an issue in dispute. A few
years before, in Eureko v. Slovak Republic, the Tribunal decided that
the BIT was not in violation of EU law because unlike in Micula
Brothers, the BIT was still fully enforceable. 131
If interpreted through the lens of the US regulatory takings
jurisprudence, the Micula Brothers case might reach a different
outcome. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York,132 the US
Supreme Court formulated a comprehensive test to assess regulatory
taking based on three elements: (1) the economic impact of the
regulation on the particular owner;133 (2) the protection of reasonable
128. See id. art. 2(1) (“Romania shall not pay out any incompatible aid referred to in
Article 1 and shall recover any incompatible aid referred to in Article 1 which has already been
paid out to any one of the entities constituting the single economic unit benefiting from that aid
in partial implementation or execution of the arbitral award of 11 December 2013, as well as
any aid paid out to any one of the entities constituting the single economic unit benefiting from
that aid in further implementation of the arbitral award of 11 December 2013 that the
Commission has not been made aware of or that is paid out after the date of this Decision. 2.
Viorel Micula, Ioan Micula, S.C. European Food SA, S.C. Starmill S.R.L., S.C. Multipack,
European Drinks SA, Rieni Drinks SA, Scandic Distilleries SA, Transilvania General ImportExport S.R.L., and West Leasing S.R.L shall be jointly liable to repay the State aid received by
any one of them.”).
129. See id. at ¶ 48.
130. See Electrabel SA v Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19 (Nov. 25, 2015).
131. See Achmea B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2008-13,
Final Award (Dec. 7, 2012).
132. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
133. Id. at 124. See also JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER ET. AL, PROPERTY: LAW RULES,
POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 1192 (Wolters Kluwer, 6th ed.) (elaborating that the greater the
value reduction, the more likely the regulation will qualify as a taking); Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (finding that complete deprivation of any “economically
viable use” is likely to be a taking unless the regulation denies property rights that never
existed in the first place); accord Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 458 U.S. 1
(1988); Kaiser Aetna v. United States., 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979) (holding that the main
characteristic of this ad-hoc test is that it has to be applied to every takings case as separate
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or distinct investment-backed expectations;134 and (3) the character of
the governmental action.135
The appellant in Penn Central was UGP Properties, who owned
the land where the Grand Central Station was erected and wanted to
construct a 50 story-high office building above the Grand Central
Terminal in New York City. The City’s Board of Estimates barred
that construction based on the Landmarks Preservation Law
(“Preservation Law”). The Board also rejected a second proposal to
build a building with different characteristics above Grand Central.
Due to the denial of both requests to build on the property owned by
UGP Properties, the appellant brought suit. The appellant stated that
the application of the Preservation Law had taken their property
without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments and arbitrarily deprived them of their property without
due process of law.136
Justice Brennan reasoned that in deciding whether a particular
governmental action has affected a taking, the Court must focus both
on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the
interference with rights in the parcel as a whole.137 Justice Brennan
concluded that the ordinance could not be considered a regulatory
taking because the economic impact of the Preservation Law did not
negate any benefit to the appellant.138 On the contrary, the impact of
takings law has to be analyzed in the property as a whole and not only
rather than applying a blanket formula to all of them); see also Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135
(1921).
134. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124; see also SINGER, supra note 133, at 1194
(explaining if a citizen has already invested substantially, reasonably relying on an existing
statutory or regulatory scheme, then the regulation is more likely to be a taking; if the
regulation prevents the owner from realizing an expected benefit in the future, imposing
merely opportunity cost, it is less likely to be a taking).
135. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124. This element fluctuates between the
governmental prerogative of enacting legislation to limit property rights without just
compensation under the basis of “protection of the welfare,” and the limit to compensate every
time legislation enacted limits every kind of property rights. See Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident
to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law”).
(“However, if protecting the welfare is sufficient to characterize a government action as a
legitimate regulation rather than an unconstitutional taking, then the government will be able
to destroy property interests at will without and the takings clause will be meaningless.”);
SINGER, supra note 133, at 1194.
136. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 122.
137. Id. at 133.
138. Id. at 138.
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on the impact that the law may have on specific parcels of the
property.139 Further, Justice Brennan showed that there was indeed
protection of reasonable investment-backed expectations of UGP
Properties because the investor had obtained benefits when it leased
Grand Central Station and such benefits negated the argument of lack
of protection to investors.140
Applying Justice Brennan’s reasoning to the Micula Brothers
case, when the investor puts on one side of the scale his proprietary
interest, the investor’s wealth allegedly taken is in fact the result of
prior regulatory interventions that have served his interests.141 Only if
the judge, like Justice Brennan in Penn Central, is willing to take
apart the entitlement of the investor can he decide whether the
investor has lost or deserves protection through compensation.
2. Balancing the Right to Regulate for Public Policy with the Fair and
Equitable Treatment (FET) Standard for Investors
The crucial point in the Micula Brothers case is whether the
State, through statements or conduct, contributed to the creation of a
reasonable expectation of regulatory stability under the FET standard.
For the tribunal, it is irrelevant whether the State wishes to treat the
investors in violation of the FET standard because it is sufficient that
it acted in a manner that would reasonably be understood to create
such an appearance.142 The element of reasonableness cannot be
separated from the promise, assurance, or representation, particularly
if the promise is not contained in a contract or is otherwise not stated
explicitly. Whether a State has created a legitimate expectation in an
investor is thus a factual assessment that must be undertaken in
consideration of all the surrounding circumstances.143 So, the question
is how to assess the circumstances in light of what appears to be an

139. Id. at 130.
140. See id. at 136 (noting that UGP maintained the right to use the space as was
originally intended, and thus could still gain from the property’s value even without building
office space).
141. See generally Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Noncoercive State, 39 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923); Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and
Foucault!, 15 LEGAL STUD. F. 327 (1991).
142. Micula v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Final Award, ¶ 708 (2013)
(repeating the finding that the incentives themselves gave rise to legitimate expectations of
their duration).
143. Id. at ¶ 669.
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implicit promise that affects both the power of the State to regulate
for public policy and the FET of investors.
It is possible to trace the Penn Central test elaborated by Justice
Brennan in the Annex on Expropriation in the Commission position in
TTIP, in CETA 2016, and with a minimum change in the EUVietnam FTA offering criteria to protect the State’s right to
regulate.144 In particular, these agreements provide a multi-factor test
for judges to assess the context around potential indirect
expropriations:
2. (a) the economic impact of the measure or series of measures,
although the sole fact that a measure or series of measures of a
Party has an adverse effect on the economic value of an
investment does not establish that an indirect expropriation has
occurred;
(b) the duration of the measure or series of measures of a Party;
(c) the extent to which the measure or series of measures
interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed
expectations; and
(d) the character of the measure or series of measures, notably
their object, context and intent.
3. For greater certainty, except in the rare circumstance when the
impact of a measure or series of measures is so severe in light of
its purpose that it appears manifestly excessive, nondiscriminatory measures of a Party that are designed and applied
to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as health,
safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect
expropriations.145

The EU-Vietnam FTA lacks only clause 2(c), addressing
“reasonable investment expectations,” which is included in a similar
test in the TPP’s Annex 9-B on expropriation.146 Despite these
minimal differences, overall the test of whether there is an indirect
expropriation or regulatory taking is nearly similar in all four FTAs,
144. See 2015 TTIP Proposal, supra note 3, at Annex I; CETA, supra note 3, at Annex
8-A.
145. See CETA, supra note 3, at Annex 8-A.
146. See Trans-Pacific Partnership, Annex 9-B, art. 3a(ii), n.36, Feb. 4, 2016,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text
[hereinafter TPP] (“For greater certainty, whether an investor’s investment-backed
expectations are reasonable depends, to the extent relevant, on factors such as whether the
government provided the investor with binding written assurances and the nature and extent of
governmental regulation or the potential for government regulation in the relevant sector.”).
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demonstrating that there is no real controversy on this issue thanks to
the legacy of Penn Central.
Even though there are similarities between EU-Vietnam FTA
and CETA on the FET standard, what remains highly controversial
between the EU and the US in TTIP is the definition of the FET
standard of investment. In the TPP, the FET is part of a minimum
standard of treatment that is in accordance with “customary
international law principles, including fair and equitable treatment
and full protection and security.”147 This means that full protection
and security are also part of the minimum standard of treatment under
CIL, so that the host State needs to act with due diligence to secure
and protect the investment. In contrast, CETA, the EU-Vietnam FTA,
and TTIP depart from CIL because there is no broad notion of equity
protection for the investors under CIL, though all the protections for
the investors are expressly enumerated in the treaties.148 As Srilal M.
Perera explains in two incredibly dense and thoughtful articles, the
increasing use of CIL in investment arbitration through notions of
equity and fairness filtrated through the FET standard has become a
“prolific phenomenon in the past decade.”149 Perera shows that the
dangers of “equity-based decision-making,” when applied in the
context of the FET standard, have resulted in a “subjective, vague and
ambiguous characteristic of those undefined terms.” As a result,
Perera explains, with largely inconsistent awards there was no
established criteria or a line of precedent through which to interpret
equity-based decisions more objectively.150 Thus, the major problem
of this evolution of interpretation of CIL to assess the FET standard is
the subjectivity of judgments due to arbitrators’ discretion of
interpretation. As a consequence, the degree of liability imposed as
reparation has varied without any criteria for the standard of
damages.151
In light of these critiques, there is a clear divide between the
TPP, which includes CIL in the interpretation of the FET standard,
and CETA and EU-Vietnam FTA, which have set aside the linkage
147. See TPP, supra note 146, art. 9.6.
148. See CETA, supra note 3, art. 8.10 (covering the Treatment of investors and of
covered investments).
149. See Srilal M. Perera, Equity-Based Decision-Making and the Fair and Equitable
Treatment Standard: Lessons From the Argentine Investment Disputes – Part I, 13 J. WORLD
INV. & TRADE 210, 212 (2012).
150. Id. at 213.
151. Id. at 215.
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between CIL and the FET standard. This remains one of the main
causes of the divergence between the US and EU approaches to
investment protection. The final legacy of Micula Brothers in CETA
is the clarification that this agreement cannot be used to prevent the
EU to enforce its State aid laws.152
B.

(Extra-)EU Free Trade Agreements: How to Avoid Jurisdictional
Clashes and Safeguard the Interpretive Monopoly of the CJEU

1. Autonomy of the EU Legal Order and the CJEU’s Jurisprudence
As recognized by the CJEU in its Van Gend en Loos ruling, the
EU “constitutes a new legal order of international law,”153 that is, a
legal order distinct from “pure” public international law. The Court
went even further in another seminal judgment, Costa,154 where it
observed that the law stemming from the Treaty (now Treaties) is to
be regarded as “an independent source of law”155 and, “because of its
special and original nature,” it cannot be overridden by domestic legal
provisions.156 A corollary attached to the “specialty” and “originality”
of EU law is the recognition and protection of its independence or
autonomy.157 The content and extent of this autonomy, as well as the
principles of supremacy and direct effect that define it, have been
shaped and safeguarded by the CJEU over the years; it is thanks to the
Court’s jurisprudence that the autonomy of the EU legal order has
finally reached the status of an EU constitutional principle.158
152. See Press Release, European Commission, CETA: EU and Canada Agree on New
Approach on Investment in Trade Agreement (Feb. 29, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_IP-16-399_en.htm.
153. NV Algemene Transport v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, Case 2662, [1963] E.C.R. 3, 12.
154. Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., Case 6-64, [1964] E.C.R. 1141, 594.
155. Id.; see also Jan W. van Rossem, The Autonomy of EU Law: More is less?, in
BETWEEN AUTONOMY AND DEPENDENCE: THE EU LEGAL ORDER UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS, 13 (Ramses A. Wessel & Steven Blockmans eds., 2013)
(observing that in the French version of the ruling, the sentence is translated as “une source
autonome.”).
156. Flaminio Costa, [1964] E.C.R. 1141, 594.
157. See Bruno de Witte, Direct Effect, Primacy, and the Nature of the Legal Order, in
THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW, 323-262 (Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca eds., 2011); see also
van Rossem, supra note 155, at 41-42 (commenting on the interplay between autonomy and
sovereignty.).
158. See generally RENÉ BARENTS, THE AUTONOMY OF COMMUNITY LAW (2004);
Joseph H. H. Weiler & Ulrich R. Haltern, The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order:
Through the Looking Glass, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 411 (1996); Bruno de Witte, European Union
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This principle has both an external and internal dimensions.
While the latter requires that the powers of the EU institutions not be
eroded by national authorities and that EU norms not be outlawed by
national legal systems, the former ensures that the functioning of
international courts do not put those powers into question and that the
norms of international law do not supersede EU law within those
courts.159 In particular, concerns have been raised that the autonomy
of the EU legal order may be called into question by the investorState arbitration mechanisms envisaged in EU agreements with nonEU countries.160 Similar problems arise also with regard to the
relationship between the EU law, on one hand, and, on the other hand,
the 2015 TTIP Proposal and the new FTAs containing ICS clauses.
As already clarified in Section I, our analysis was conceived before
the release of both the CETA 2016 and the EU-Vietnam FTA, thus
taking into account especially the ISDS system. However, the risks
for possible infringement of the EU autonomy principle concern the
ICS as well and will be accordingly considered.
The concerns regarding the impact of investor-State adjudication
on the autonomy of EU legal order are based on the joint application
of Article 19(1) of the TEU and Article 344 of the TFEU, according
to which the interpretation and application of EU law falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court, as repeatedly noted by EU judges.
Article 19(1) of the TEU demands that the Court (and only the Court)
must “ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties
Law: How Autonomous is its Legal Order? 65 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT 141
(2010).
159. See Bruno de Witte, A Selfish Court?: The Court of Justice and the Design of
International Dispute Settlement Beyond the European Union, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
JUSTICE AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES, 33-46 (Marise
Cremona & Anne Thies eds., 2014) (giving an overview of the relationship between the CJEU
and other dispute settlement systems, as well as of the external dimension of the Court’s
action.).
160. See EMMANUEL GAILLARD, LEGAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION,
39-66 (2010) (commenting on the autonomy of international arbitration); see also George
Bermann, Reconciling European Union Law Demands with the Demands of International
Arbitration, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1193 (2011) (providing a broad analysis of the interplay
between EU law and arbitration). On the TTIP, see the Commission’s Concept Paper, supra
note 10, ¶ IV.1. Concerns have been expressed with regard to the compatibility of ISDS with
the principle of autonomy of the EU legal order. A risk of such incompatibility would exist
especially if ISDS tribunals were to interpret EU law in a manner that would be binding on EU
institutions. Since ISDS tribunals only interpret the international agreement in question and
would examine EU law only as a matter of fact, one may argue that concerns related to the
autonomy of EU law are unfounded.
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the law is observed,” while Article 344 of the TFEU provides that
“Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the
interpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of
settlement other than those provided for therein.” In light of these
provisions, it becomes clear that any FTA between the EU and third
countries must ensure that investor-State tribunals respect EU law, as
interpreted and applied by the CJEU (and not by the tribunals on their
own.)161 The Court has confirmed this in a number of judgments and
opinions in which, while admitting that the EU’s treaty-making power
comprises the creation of an international dispute settlement system
whose institutions are vested with the authority to adopt rulings that
are binding on the EU (including the CJEU), it has held that said
institutions cannot render binding interpretations of EU law.162 In the
Mox-Plant judgment, for instance, the Court made it clear that an
international agreement cannot affect the allocation of responsibilities
defined in the Treaties and, consequently, “the autonomy of the
Community legal system, compliance with which the Court ensures
under Article 220 of the EC (now Art. 19 of the TEU)”. That
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court is confirmed, in the opinion of the
Court, by Article 344 of the TFEU, by which “Member States
undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or
application of the EC Treaty to any method of settlement other than
161. See Angelos Dimopoulos, The Compatibility of Future EU Investment Agreements
with EU Law, 39 LEGAL ISSUES ECON. INTEGRATION 447, 470 (2012) [hereinafter
Compatibility of Future EU Investment Agreements]; Julie A. Maupin, Where Should Europe’s
Investment Path Lead? Reflections on August Reinisch, “Quo Vadis Europe?”, 12 SANTA
CLARA J. INT’L L. 183, 219 (2014) (noting that it is the Court, and not the arbitrators on their
own, that have made this determination).
162. See Opinion 1/75, Understanding on a Local Cost Standard, [1975] E.C.R. 1355.;
see generally Opinion C-2/13, Draft international agreement – Accession of the European
Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms [2013] (admitting that the EU’s treaty-making power comprises the creation of an
international dispute settlement system whose institutions are vested with the authority to
adopt rulings that are binding on the EU (including the CJEU)); Opinion 1/09, Draft agreement
– Creation of a unified patent litigation system, [2011] E.C.R. I-1137; Opinion 1/00, Proposed
agreement between the European Community and non-Member States on the establishment of
a European Common Aviation Area, [2002] E.C.R. I-3498; Opinion 2/92, Competence of the
Community or one of its institutions to participate in the Third Revised Decision of the OECD
on national treatment, [1995] E.C.R. 521; Opinion 1/94, Competence of the Community to
conclude international agreements concerning services and the protection of intellectual
property, [1994] E.C.R. 5267; Opinion 1/91, Draft Agreement Between the Community, on the
one hand, and the countries of the European Free Trade Association, on the other, relating to
the creation of the European Economic Area, [1991] E.C.R. 6079; Opinion 1/78, International
Agreement on Natural Rubber, [1979] E.C.R. 2871.
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those provided for therein.”163 In this respect, it is important to point
out that, prima facie, Article 344 of the TFEU, which refers only to
EU Member States, does not seem to come into play in the case of
investor-State adjudication as this mechanism does not cover State-toState disputes.164 Nevertheless, in the literature it has been claimed
that Article 344 of the TFEU could be interpreted, in theory, as
covering situations concerning at least one State.165 This would imply
that, if future EU FTAs are concluded as mixed agreements – as they
most likely will be –, the outcome may be different, since it could be
possible to question the compatibility of the agreements with the EU
legal order on the basis of that provision.166
As to the various CJEU opinions, the legal framework is the
assessment of an international agreement by the CJEU in accordance
with Article 218(11) of the TFEU as occurred in the case of the FTA
with Singapore, for which an opinion has been requested by the
Commission.167 Article 218(11) of the TFEU provides that “[a]
Member State, the European Parliament, the Council or the
Commission may obtain the opinion of the Court of Justice as to
whether an agreement envisaged is compatible with the Treaties.
Where the opinion of the Court is adverse, the agreement envisaged
may not enter into force unless it is amended or the Treaties are
revised.” The rationale of this provision is to carry out a review of the
agreement negotiated by the Commission prior to its conclusion so
that, rather than having the Court rule on its validity in the context of
a preliminary procedure (Article 267 of the TFEU) or of an
annulment action (Article 263 of the TFEU), the EU institutions may
amend the text of the treaty in order to ensure its compatibility with
the EU treaties (unless the latter are revised.)
163. See TFEU, supra note 31, art. 344, at ¶ 123.
164. See Stephan W. Schill, Editorial: Opinion 2/13 – The End for Dispute Settlement in
EU Trade and Investment Agreements?, 16 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 379, 384 (2015).
165. See Konstanze Von Papp, Clash of “Autonomous Legal Orders”: Can EU Member
State Courts Bridge the Jurisdictional Divide Between Investment Tribunals and the ECJ? A
Plea for Direct Referral from Investment Tribunals to the ECJ, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
1039, 1052-54 (2013).
166. See also Marc Burgstaller, Investor-State Arbitration in EU International
Investment Agreements with Third States, 39 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 207, 217
n.45 (2012) (noting, in relation to Article 344 of TFEU, that the argument according to which
investor-State arbitration clauses with third states would not be prevented from being included
in EU free trade and investment agreements assumes that these agreements will be concluded
as ‘pure’ EU agreements rather than mixed agreements).
167. See supra Introduction.
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For our purposes, it is sufficient to cite a few passages from
Opinion 1/09 on the European and Community Patents Courts, in
which the CJEU discussed the creation of a single European judicial
institution for intellectual property rights with exclusive
jurisdiction.168
First of all, the Court stressed that “an international agreement
concluded with third countries may confer new judicial powers” on
the aforesaid judicial institution, provided that “it does not change the
essential character of the function of the Court as conceived in the
TEU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU).”169
Moreover, it repeated that an international agreement may affect the
Court’s own powers provided that the indispensable conditions for
safeguarding the essential character of those powers are satisfied and,
consequently, “there is no adverse effect on the autonomy of the EU
legal order.”170
The approach described above was reiterated with further
emphasis in Opinion 2/13 on the accession to the European Court of
Human Rights (“ECtHR”),171 in which the Court made clear, once
168. See Roberto Baratta, National Courts as ‘Guardians’ and ‘Ordinary Courts’ of EU
Law: Opinion 1/09 of the ECJ, 38 LEGAL ISSUES ECON. INTEGRATION 297 (2011) (writing
from the standpoint of EU autonomy); Christina Eckes, The European Court of Justice, supra
note 62, at 85; Matthew Parish, International Courts and the European Legal Order, 23 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 141 (2012). See also Opinion 1/91, supra note 162 (stating that the jurisdiction
conferred on the EEA Court under Article 2(c), Article 96(1)(a), and Article 117(1) of the
agreement is likely to adversely affect the allocation of responsibilities defined in the Treaties
and, hence, the autonomy of the Community legal order, respect for which must be assured by
the Court of Justice pursuant to Article 164 of the EEC Treaty. This exclusive jurisdiction of
the Court of Justice is confirmed by Article 219 of the EEC Treaty, under which Member
States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of that
treaty to any method of settlement other than those provided for in the Treaty); Opinion 1/00,
supra note 162 (holding that preservation of the autonomy of the Community legal order
requires therefore, first, that the essential character of the powers of the Community and its
institutions as conceived in the Treaty remain unaltered). Second, it requires that the
procedures for ensuring uniform interpretation of the rules of the ECAA Agreement and for
resolving disputes will not have the effect of binding the Community and its institutions, in the
exercise of their internal powers, to a particular interpretation of the rules of Community law
referred to in that agreement. Opinion 1/91, supra note 162, at ¶ 61-65; Opinion 1/92, Draft
Agreement Between the Community on the One Hand, and the Countries of the European Free
Trade Association, on the Other, Relating to the Creation of the European Economic Area,
[1992] E.C.R. I-2821, at ¶ 32, 34.
169. See Opinion 1/09, supra note 162.
170. Id.
171. Opinion of the Court (Full Court) of 18 December 2014, Accession of the European
Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental; on
investor-State arbitration in light of opinion 2/13 see Filippo Fontanelli, The long shadow of
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and for all, that no body or institution other than the CJEU can
interpret EU law in a binding way for Member States and EU
institutions,172 nor determine the distribution of responsibility
between a Member State and the EU.173 Therefore, the CJEU affirmed
that it has an exclusive monopoly both in interpreting EU law and in
allocating powers to the EU and its Member States by defining the
scope of their competences. In Opinion 2/13, it stated that the
exclusive interpretive monopoly would be infringed if the EU and its
institutions, including the CJEU, were “subject to the control
mechanisms provided for by the ECHR and, in particular, to the
decisions and judgments of the ECtHR.”174 Indeed, “any action by the
bodies given decision-making powers by the ECHR . . . must not
have the effect of binding the EU and its institutions, in the exercise
of their internal powers, to a particular interpretation of the rules of
EU law.”175 As far as the “allocation monopoly” is concerned, the
Court observed, inter alia, with regard to the “co-respondent
mechanism” envisaged in Article 3 of the draft agreement that “if the
EU or Member States request leave to intervene as co-respondents in
a case before the ECtHR,” they must give their reasons and fulfill the
conditions for their participation in the procedure. 176 In doing so, the
ECtHR would be given the power to decide on that request in the
light of the plausibility of those reasons, that is, “to assess the rules of
EU law governing the division of powers between the EU and its
Member States as well as the criteria for the attribution of their acts or
omissions, in order to adopt a final decision in that regard which
Opinion 2/13 on the Commission’s proposal of an investment court system in the TTIP, on file
with author; Schill, supra note 164 (discussing the implications of the opinion of the Court for
investor-State arbitration).
172. See Opinion 2/13, supra note 171, at ¶¶ 179-200
173. Id. at ¶¶ 215-35.
174. Id. at ¶ 181.
175. Id. at ¶ 184
176. Article 3.1 amends Article 36 of the ECHR (adding a paragraph 4 which reads as
follows: “The European Union or a member State of the European Union may become a corespondent to proceedings by decision of the Court in the circumstances set out in the
Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. A co-respondent is a party to the case. The
admissibility of an application shall be assessed without regard to the participation of a corespondent in the proceedings.”). See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, FIFTH NEGOTIATION MEETING
BETWEEN THE CDHH AD HOC NEGOTIATION GROUP AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON
THE ACCESSION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS (June 10, 2013), http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Accession/
Meeting_reports/47_1(2013)008rev2_EN.pdf.
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would be binding both on the Member States and on the EU.”177 It is
precisely such review that would “interfere with the division of
powers between the EU and its Member States.”178
Moreover, the Court stressed the need to respect the principle of
prior involvement, according to which the CJEU must review the
compliance of EU measures with international obligations before an
external body from the standpoint of both the validity and
interpretation of EU primary and secondary law.179 As noted by the
Court in its 2/13 Opinion, the draft agreement does not contain an
explicit prohibition, imposed upon the ECtHR, to interpret the case
law of the CJEU where the latter has already given a ruling on the
same question of law as that at issue in the proceedings before the
ECtHR. In other words, the agreement could be interpreted as giving
the ECtHR – rather than the CJEU – the power to rule on such a
question.180 This implies that, in order for the agreement to be in
compliance with the prior involvement principle, a provision must be
inserted “in such a way as to ensure that, in any case pending before
the ECtHR, the EU is fully and systematically informed, so that the
competent EU institution is able to assess whether the Court of Justice
has already given a ruling on the question at issue in that case and, if
it has not, to arrange for the prior involvement procedure to be
initiated.”181
Another issue raised in the 2/13 Opinion concerned the
compatibility of the procedure set up in the agreement with EU law
from the point of view of the scope of the CJEU’s jurisdiction. As
clarified in the draft explanatory report of the agreement, Article 3(6)
is intended to enable the CJEU to assess the compatibility of a
provision of EU law with the ECtHR, meaning, in essence, that the
Court can rule only on the “validity of a legal provision contained in
secondary law or on the interpretation of a provision of primary
law.”182 From this, it follows that the agreement “excludes the
possibility of bringing a matter before the Court of Justice in order for
it to rule on a question of interpretation of secondary law by means of
the prior involvement procedure,” with the ultimate result that if “the
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See Opinion 2/13, supra note 171, at ¶ 224.
Id. at ¶ 225.
Id. at ¶¶ 236-48.
Id. at ¶¶ 238-40.
Id. at ¶ 241.
Id. at ¶ 242.
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Court of Justice were not allowed to provide the definitive
interpretation of secondary law, and if the ECtHR. . . . had itself to
provide a particular interpretation from among the plausible options,”
there would most certainly be “a breach of the principle that the Court
of Justice has exclusive jurisdiction over the definitive interpretation
of EU law.”183
2. Applicable Law, Prior Involvement and the Allocation of Powers
between the EU and its Member States
The various constraints identified by the CJEU in Opinion 2/13
with regard to the applicable law, the division of powers between the
EU and its Member States, and the principle of prior involvement
may extend beyond the relationship with the ECtHR, and thus
represent a serious obstacle to the operation of other kinds of dispute
resolution mechanisms, including investor-State arbitral tribunals.
This is clear by looking at the Commission’s Concept Paper on the
TTIP of May 2015, mentioned above, which observed that the
agreement should make it clear that: (a) “the application of domestic
law does not fall under the competence of ISDS tribunals”; (b)
“domestic law can be taken into account by ISDS tribunals only as
factual matter”; and (c) “any interpretations of domestic law made by
ISDS tribunals are not binding on domestic courts.”184
According to the Commission, therefore, the autonomy of the
EU legal order – namely of the CJEU – could be guaranteed only if
arbitral tribunals were required to apply international law (that is,
both the provisions of the agreement and other rules of international
law applicable to the parties) rather than the law of the host State. It
should be noted that in this context, the “law of the host State” means
national and EU law, since the latter prevails over and is part of the
former. In this light, the exclusion of EU law from the scope of
jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals is at odds with a general, consolidated
trend in international investment law, which regards domestic law as
part of the sources of law applicable to investment disputes.185 Thus,
183. Id. at ¶ 246.
184. See Commission Concept Paper, supra note 10, ¶ IV.3.
185. See generally HEGE ELISABETH KJOS, APPLICABLE LAW IN INVESTOR-STATE
ARBITRATION: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013); Ole
Spiermann, Investment Arbitration: Applicable Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
1373-90 (Marc Bungenberg, Jörn Griebel, Stephan Hobe, & August Reinisch eds., 2015)
(writing on the applicable law in investor-State arbitration from the standpoint of the
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from the Commission’s Concept Paper it can be inferred that any
matters that are relevant to the review of the claim brought under the
agreement, but which are not directly governed by it, will fall outside
the tribunals’ jurisdiction. If relevant, the interpretation of national
and EU law will be examined only as a factual matter and will follow
the prevailing approach taken by domestic courts and authorities; the
legality of EU or Member States’ measures under EU or national law
will not be reviewed. However, it is unclear what the role of the
arbitral tribunals and their task of “taking into account” domestic
(national and EU) law as “factual matter” actually involves. Is it
plausible to believe that in order to apply the provisions contained in
the agreement, no interpretation of national and/or EU law in the
context of a proceeding before arbitral tribunals will be necessary?
Will arbitral tribunals retain the competence to allocate powers
between the EU and the Member States? In other words, will they
have jurisdiction to attribute responsibility for acts or omissions that
allegedly constitute a violation of the rights of an investor and,
therefore, to identify the respondent in the case (i.e. the EU and/or the
State)? Of course, these questions apply mutatis mutandis also to the
2015 TTIP Proposal, which replaces arbitral tribunals and ISDS
clauses with ICS mechanisms, as well as to CETA 2016 and the EUVietnam FTA. Furthermore, the assonances between the tribunals
envisaged by both agreements and the ECtHR for being both
permanent institutions are certainly more striking than those between
the ECtHR and investor-State arbitration. This means that as the
relationship between the ECtHR and the CJEU was found
problematic by the CJEU, the same may happen with regard to the
relationship between the latter and permanent investment tribunals.
With respect to the role of EU law in the reasoning of investment
tribunals, it must be observed, as a preliminary consideration, that
third-country investors usually seek to challenge EU and Member
States’ acts and obtain monetary compensation. That being said, when
we consider that an investment tribunal must assess whether a
provision of a FTA has been infringed by a Member State or the EU,
it is difficult to imagine how it could possibly do so without

relationship between domestic and international law); Collins C. Ajibo, The Governing Law in
Investor State Arbitration: the BIT, International Law, and Choice of Law Clause, INT’L ARB.
L. REV. 125 (2015).

1126 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:1081
interpreting national and/or EU primary and secondary law.186 Indeed,
investment tribunals and the CJEU may have competing jurisdiction
with regard to issues of EU law to be applied to the dispute rather
than to the particular circumstances of the dispute itself.187 The
argument that investment tribunals, in examining the measures
adopted by the EU and its Member States, should treat EU law as a
matter of fact rather than law and confine themselves to a merely
incidental role is unconvincing. In fact, an accurate analysis of EU
law is an essential function to be performed by investment tribunals
and, de facto, a precondition for assessing the compatibility of an EU
or national legal act with the agreement.188 Although the jurisdiction
of an investment tribunal is restricted to the adjudication of a
particular dispute and, therefore, to the interpretation and application
of the specific free trade and investment agreement, the assessment on
the protection of investment standards may, by its very nature, have
an impact on a number of EU policies such as those relating to the
internal market, competition and trade-related matters (the
environment, public health, labor, etc.). Furthermore, it is possible
that investment tribunals will give a different and broader definition
of “investment” and “investor” than that under EU law, resulting in
foreign companies relying on the standards contained in the

186. See Von Papp, supra note 165, at 1040 (citing Eureko B.V. v. The Slovak Republic,
Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability, and Suspension, PCA Case 2008-13 (Oct. 26, 2010),
para. 290) (“While arbitral tribunals tend to stress that their jurisdiction is limited to alleged
breaches of the relevant BIT, this does not mean that questions of EU law remain outside the
reach of their jurisdiction.”); Contra Schill, supra note 164, at 384-387; Stephan Schill,
Luxembourg Limits: Conditions for Investor-State Dispute Settlement Under Future EU
Investment Agreements, TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 11 (2013), https://www.transnationaldispute-management.com/article.asp?key=1943; Angelos Dimopoulos, The Involvement of the
EU in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Question of Responsibilities, COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 1671, 1699-1700 (2014) [hereinafter The Involvement of the EU in Investor-State
Dispute Settlement].
187. See Von Papp, supra note 165, at 1040.
188. See Inge Govaere, Beware the Trojan Horse: Dispute Settlement in (Mixed)
Agreements and the Autonomy of the EU Legal Order, in MIXED AGREEMENTS REVISITED
192 (Christophe Hillion, & Panos Koutrakos eds., 2010); Steffen Hindelang, The Autonomy of
the European Legal Order: EU Constitutional Limits to Investor-State Arbitration on the Basis
of Future EU Investment-Related Agreements, in COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY AFTER
LISBON: EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 1387-98, 194-95 (Marc
Bungenberg, & Christoph Herrmann eds., 2013); H. LENK, Investor-state arbitration under
TTIP. Resolving investment disputes in an (autonomous) EU legal order, SIEPS 2015:2
(2015), http://www.sieps.se/sites/default/files/Sieps%202015_2%20web.pdf.; Schill, supra
note 164, at 37–54.
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investment agreement before the international tribunals (but not
before the CJEU).
The breach of the CJEU’s interpretive monopoly is significant
not only because the Court could lose its exclusive jurisdiction to
interpret and apply EU law, but also because the awards rendered by
the tribunals, stemming directly from jurisdictional institutions
established by the international agreement, have a binding nature; in
order to be effective, the awards must be respected by domestic
courts, including the CJEU.189 This applies also to CETA 2016, where
it is stated in Article 8.41 that “[a]n award issued pursuant to this
Section shall be binding between the disputing parties and in respect
of that particular case” and additionally that “a disputing party shall
recognise and comply with an award without delay.”
Since international agreements are binding on the Member States
and EU institutions pursuant to Article 216.2 TFEU,190 being “an
integral part of the EU legal order”191 and in a primacy status vis-à-vis
secondary law (but not vis-à-vis the EU treaties), the CJEU must
interpret EU law in accordance with those agreements and the awards
delivered by the tribunals established therein.192 Moreover, as
investment awards are enforced in conformity with either the New
York Convention or ICSID Convention, it is impossible for the EU to
respect international obligations related to the enforcement of the
awards and simultaneously to prevent their implementation in the EU
legal order.193 What has been noted with regard to intra-EU BITs
holds true also in the case of extra-EU agreements: an interpretation
of EU law that is not in compliance with an investment award will
probably induce foreign investors to bring a claim before the
investment tribunal and potentially lead to exorbitant requests for
compensation. Moreover, the lack of permanence and the absence of
an official doctrine of precedence of arbitral tribunals may attenuate
the constraints vis-à-vis the CJEU while creating additional problems
of consistency that may endanger the relationship between the
189. See generally JULIEN FOURET, ENFORCEMENT OF INVESTMENT TREATY
ARBITRATION AWARDS: A GLOBAL GUIDE (2015).
190. “Agreements concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions of the
Union and on its Member States.”
191. See Haegeman, supra note 60, [1974] E.C.R 449; Case C-366/10 Air Transport
Association of America v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, Case C-366/10,
[2011] E.C.R. I-0000, ¶ 50.
192. For more on the Consistent Interpretation Doctrine, see supra note 76.
193. LENK, supra note 188, at 45.

1128 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:1081
tribunals and the EU legal order.194 In this respect, it remains to be
seen whether the establishment of permanent tribunals foreseen in
CETA 2016 and in the EU-Vietnam FTA will justify a new
perspective on the scope and legal force of the awards once they
become operational. Specifically, a reading of Article 8.41 of CETA
2016 which limits the binding effect of the award to that “particular
case” and between the disputing parties seems to exclude radical
changes to this effect195. However, the 2015 TTIP Proposal196 does
not include such a self-restraint dimension of investment awards,
from the point of view of their enforcement, as there is no reference to
the particular case or dispute.
The above analysis implies that a mechanism of prior
involvement of EU institutions, including the CJEU, is needed.
Obviously, such a mechanism should not be equivalent to that
envisaged in the draft accession agreement to the ECtHR, which has
already been struck down by the CJEU. It could be inspired by it,
though. Should an EU provision be interpreted in order for an
investment tribunal to adopt a decision, the CJEU would be primarily
enabled to interpret it and/or assess its validity in light of the FTA.
The difference with the procedure set up in the draft accession
agreement would be that primary law and secondary law provisions
could be subjected to the interpretation of the Court. This could be the
right way to avoid a negative response from the CJEU should an
opinion on the compatibility of the FTA with EU law be requested
pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU. In this regard, unless amended, the
application sic et sempliciter of Article 267 TFEU (i.e., of a
preliminary ruling procedure started by the investment tribunal and
subject to such provision) does not seem to be the right solution since
it lays down two cumulative conditions. First, investment tribunals
should qualify as “tribunals” or “courts,” and second, in the exercise
of their public authority, they should be considered as judicial bodies
“of the Member States.”197 Regarding the first condition, as far as the
permanent dispute settlement system foreseen in CETA 2016 and in
the FTA with Vietnam is concerned, there do not seem to be
194. But see Jürgen Basedow, EU Law in International Arbitration: Referrals to the
European Court of Justice, J. INT’L ARB. 367, 379 (2015) (considering arbitration panels
permanent “in an institutional sense since ICSID is a permanent arbitration institution”).
195. See in the same vein Article 31(1), Ch. 8, of the EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 3.
196. 2015 TTIP Proposal, supra note 3, Article 30(1).
197. See TFEU, supra note 31, art. 267(b), 2012 O.J. C 326/47, at 164.
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insuperable obstacles for the application of Article 267 TFEU. As to
arbitral tribunals, the CJEU held that commercial arbitrators fall
outside the scope of Article 267 TFEU.198 Nevertheless, it should be
stressed that investor-State arbitration covers disputes between a State
and an investor rather than between private parties (as in commercial
arbitration). As a consequence, some commentators have rightly
argued that the Court’s reasoning cannot be transferred tout court to
this system.199 The issue raised by the second condition, however, is
more serious. Simply considering the possibility of meeting this
condition means assuming that the agreement concerned is a mixed
agreement – that is, one concluded by the EU and the Member States.
Whether or not that is the case, it is hard to find a strong basis in the
CJEU’s case law200 for arguing that, in the context of EU agreements,
investment tribunals can be considered judges of a Member State.201
Another important issue arises from the analysis of the opinions
rendered by the CJEU on a number of agreements containing
procedures similar to that envisaged in Article 267 TFEU.202
According to the CJEU, national judges must be considered
“ordinary” within the EU legal order and entrusted with the task of
implementing EU law; as such, they cannot be replaced by
international tribunals.203 As clarified in Opinion 1/09, Article 267
TFEU provides for the power or obligation of national courts to refer
questions on the interpretation and validity of EU law so as to ensure
its harmonious interpretation and application across the Union.204
Based on the CJEU’s case law, one can thus envisage the possibility
198. Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei GmbH v. Reederei Mond Hochseefischerei
Nordstern AG & Co. KG, Case 102/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1095.
199. Steffen Hindelang, Circumventing Primacy of EU Law and the CJEU’s Judicial
Monopoly by Resorting to Dispute Resolution Mechanisms Provided for in Inter-se Treaties?
The Case of Intra-EU Investment Arbitration, 39 LEGAL ISSUES ECON. INTEGRATION 179, 202
(2012) [hereinafter Circumventing Primacy of EU Law]; Von Papp, supra note 165, at 105860.
200. Paul Miles and Others v. Écoles Européennes, Case C-196/09 [2011] E.C.R. I-5139.
201. See also Bermann, supra note 28, at 406; Burgstaller, supra note 166, at 219-20.
Contra Jürgen Basedow, supra note 194, at 378-81; Dimopoulos, Compatibility of Future EU
Investment Agreements, supra note 161, at 469; see also Genentech, Inc. v. Hoechst GmbH &
Sanofi Aventis Deutschland GmbH, Case C-567/14, EU:C:2016:177, ¶ 59, n.34.
202. See Opinion 1/91, supra note 162, at 11, 54-65; Opinion 2/92, supra note 162, at
11, 37; Opinion 1/09, supra note 162, at 12.
203. See Opinion 1/09, supra note 162, at ¶ 80.
204. See Tobias Lock, Taking National Courts More Seriously? Comment on Opinion
1/09, 4 EUR. L. REV. 576 (2011) (commenting on the impact of the Opinion on the status
accorded to national courts).
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of a mechanism similar to that foreseen in Article 267 TFEU only
upon the condition that the reference to a “judge of a Member State”
will be ruled out provided that investment tribunals are subject to the
binding opinions rendered by the CJEU upon their request.
An alternative to Article 267 TFEU, to be inserted in the FTAs,
therefore, may be a solution only if it will not replicate all weaknesses
that have been already found inconsistent with EU law by the CJEU
in its jurisprudence.
Having discussed the question of the applicable law and the need
for a mechanism of prior involvement, the matter of the allocation of
powers between the EU and Member States must be now addressed.
In this regard, the relevant and applicable legal source that would
allow identification of the respondent to an action brought by an
investor is Regulation 912/2014.205 As is well known, this act
provides a framework for managing financial responsibility linked to
investor-to-State dispute settlement tribunals established by
international agreements to which the EU is a party in case of
investment disputes brought by foreign investors.206 The European
Commission, in consultation with the Member State, undertakes
identification of the respondent in case of disagreement; it is for the
CJEU to determine the allocation of responsibility between the EU
and Member States. However, Article 19 of the Regulation, which
regulates cases where no agreement is reached, does not make any
reference to the CJEU. This remains an issue to be clarified by EU
institutions; other aspects need to be addressed through rules in mixed
EU free trade and investment agreements so that the regulation may
be complemented and rendered more effective.207 It remains to be
seen what the CJEU will state in its future opinion on the FTA with
Singapore since its findings will be relevant to other agreements as
well.208 Alternatively, the CJEU could be called upon to give a
205. See Directive 2014/912 art. 6 and art. 9 of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Establishing a Framework for Managing Financial Responsibility Linked to
Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement Tribunals Established by International Agreement to
which the European Union is a party, 2014 O.J. L. 257/127.
206. See Dimopoulos, The Involvement of the EU in Investor-State Dispute Settlement,
supra note 186; Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Financial Responsibility in European International
Investment Policy, INT’L & COMP. L. QUARTERLY 499 (2014).
207. See Dimopoulos, Compatibility of Future EU Investment Agreements, supra note
161; Schill, supra note 164 (highlighting that the Statement submitted by the European
Communities to the Secretariat of the Energy Charter pursuant to Article 26(3)(b)(ii) of the
Energy Charter Treaty, OJ L 69, 115 (9 March 1998)).
208. See supra note 8.
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separate opinion for each agreement. What seems certain, however, is
that the system established in the Regulation imposes on foreign
investors the obligation to undergo proceedings that are lengthier and
more complex than those envisaged for EU investors. Moreover, with
regard to the allocation of competences between the EU and Member
States, we can only wait and see whether third-country negotiators
will be open to accepting the involvement of EU institutions (the
CJEU in particular) in the course of investment proceedings.
A final point must be made with respect to the operation of the
principle of autonomy, and particularly the question of whether and
how CETA 2016, the EU-Vietnam FTA and the 2015 TTIP Proposal
take into account the need to safeguard and comply with said
principle.
As a preliminary remark, it is clear that the Commission
considered Opinion 2/13 in drafting the 2015 TTIP Proposal, which
lays as a model for both CETA 2016 and the EU-Vietnam FTA.
Regarding the allocation of responsibility between the EU and its
Member States, the Proposal provides that the claimant must request
that the EU determine who is the respondent – the EU or one of its
Member States. A similar provision is contained in CETA 2016 and
the EU-Vietnam FTA.209 By affirming this, the Commission prevents
the Tribunal from carrying out this assessment solely in line with the
customary rules on State responsibility.210 The relevant act would be
Regulation 912/2014; it will be up to the Commission, in consultation
with the Member State, to determine which entity will act as the
respondent. From this point of view, therefore, there are no particular
obstacles to the establishment of investor-State adjudication.
From the TTIP Proposal, it also emerges that the Commission
was well aware of the Court’s findings in Opinion 2/13 with regard to
the need to respect its interpretive monopoly. Indeed, a number of
articles contained in the Proposal restrict the investment tribunals’
reliance on applicable law to international law, to the exclusion of
national and EU law. In exercising its jurisdiction, the Tribunal can
apply the TTIP and other rules of international law applicable
between the parties, but not domestic law.211 Where relevant, the
interpretation of domestic law can be assessed “as a matter of fact”
209. See CETA, supra note 3, art. 8.21; EU-Viet. Free Trade Agreement, Ch. II of Ch.
8, Sect. 3, supra note 3, art. 6.
210. See Fontanelli, supra note 171.
211. See 2015 TTIP Proposal, supra note 3, arts. 13.2-13.3.
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and must follow the prevailing interpretation of the domestic courts
and authorities.212 Moreover, the Proposal states that the Tribunal’s
interpretation of domestic law will not be binding upon domestic
authorities and that they will not review the legality of State measures
under domestic law.213 Thus, in allowing the assessment of domestic
(national and EU) law only as a matter of fact, the Commission
followed the approach outlined in its Concept Paper of May 2015, in
relation to which we have already expressed our doubts. Moreover,
the Commission affirms that the tribunals may be “required to
ascertain the meaning” of provisions of national law.214 Considering
investment tribunals cannot interpret EU law (if they did, they would
breach the principle of the autonomy of the EU legal order), the
sentence is obscure. It seems difficult, if not impossible, to draw a
distinction between “ascertaining the meaning” of and “interpreting”
a given provision. Again, it is hard to believe that a tribunal will or
should not closely examine a provision of national or EU law in order
to rule on the TTIP. In any event, relying on a supposed dividing line
between “interpretation” and “application” does not appear decisive.
If it is true that “interpretation” means determining the meaning of
particular provisions of an agreement while “application” refers to the
conformity of certain actions taken by the State(s) with the terms of
that agreement, it is equally true that the application always involves
interpretation which, vice versa, generally (but not always) leads to an
application of the law.
Finally, it must be pointed out that the Proposal does not address
the question of prior involvement precisely because it intends to solve
the question of the autonomy of the EU legal order and the CJEU in
the interpretation of the treaties and secondary law ex ante, that is, by
excluding domestic law from the applicable law. It follows that the
problem with this exclusion lies in the fact that since most investorState cases will need an interpretation of EU law, the lack of a
mechanism aimed at ensuring a sound interpretation of EU law by the
CJEU – and thus compliance with the treaties – is capable of
jeopardizing the feasibility of the entire proposal.
Which of the above elements has been transposed in CETA 2016
and in the EU-Vietnam FTA? The great majority of them: while the
reference to the ascertainment of the meaning of domestic law’s
212. Id.
213. Id. at 13.4.
214. Id. at 13.2.
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provisions has been ruled out, the idea that EU law shall be excluded
from the applicable law has been strictly followed. The same holds
true for all corollaries attached to the narrowing of the applicable
law’s scope and extent: (1) the treaty and international law rules and –
this is a novelty compared to the Proposal – principles are the only
applicable sources of law, and (2) domestic law may be interpreted
only as a matter of fact.215 This means that the criticalities mentioned
above on the lack of a system of prior mechanisms apply all the same.
Moreover, as foreseen in CETA 2016 and in the EU-Vietnam FTA,
the establishment of an appellate tribunal entrusted with a number of
tasks aimed at reviewing awards the lower tribunal renders might
complicate matters. Indeed, it is stated that the appellate tribunal may
“uphold, modify or reverse a Tribunal’s award based on (a) errors in
the application or ‘of applicable law’ and on (b) manifest errors in the
appreciation of the facts, including the appreciation of relevant
domestic law.”216
In light of the above, the question of the incompatibility of a
system of investor-State dispute settlement with the principle of
autonomy must be taken seriously, because investment tribunals are
naturally required to interpret EU law whether directly or indirectly
(not simply incidentally) in order to assess the conformity of
measures adopted by Member States or the EU with the agreement
(and, more generally, international law). While the issue of the
distribution of responsibility between national authorities and the EU
could be solved by the application of Regulation 912/2014, a new
mechanism of prior involvement of the EU, namely the CJEU and/or
the European Commission, is needed. A mechanism inspired by the
preliminary procedure envisaged in Article 267 TFEU but different
than the latter in a number of aspects, as it has been already pointed
out, might prevent investment tribunals from curtailing the exclusive
jurisdiction of the CJEU. Needless to say, this can be an adequate
solution only if the Court’s opinion will be regarded as binding upon
the investment tribunals in the engagement with EU law. As
previously mentioned, a softer alternative would institutionalize the
intervention of the European Commission as an ex ante privileged
interpreter of EU law before the said tribunals.
215. See CETA, supra note 3, art. 8.31, at ¶ 1-2.; EU-Viet. Free Trade Agreement, Ch. II
of Ch. 8, Sect. 3, supra note 3, art. 16, ¶ 2.
216. See CETA, supra note 3, art. 8.28, at ¶ 2; EU-Viet. Free Trade Agreement, Ch. II of
Ch. 8, Sect. 3, supra note 3, art. 13, ¶ 2.
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Another solution could be to opt for a procedure that follows the
legal framework set up by the Agreement on the European Economic
Area (“EEA Agreement”) vis-á-vis the relationship between the
European Free Trade Association (“EFTA”) Court and the EU,217 and
draw from it possible solutions for ensuring the respect of the
principle of autonomy in relation to the functioning of the investment
tribunals established by free trade and investment agreements. The
EEA Agreement, along with its annexes and protocols, contains a
number of provisions aimed at preventing conflicts with the EU legal
order. A system of continuous exchange of information between
EFTA, EEA and EU institutions is established, including between the
EFTA Court and the CJEU. From a jurisdictional viewpoint, the EEA
Agreement puts in place a system aimed at preserving a homogeneous
interpretation of the Agreement, i.e. at ensuring that EU law and the
CJEU’s case law are not contradicted by the EFTA Court.218 In this
respect, an important tool envisaged in the Statute and the Rules of
Procedure of the EFTA Court is represented by the role assigned to
the European Commission. From a joint reading of Article 36 of the
EFTA Court Statute and Article 89 of the Rules of Procedures, it can
be inferred that the Commission has both jus standi and jus locus
standi in judicio before the EFTA Court. So far the Commission has
always submitted its written observations in the disputes before the
Court, and as a result has exerted a strong influence on the case law
tendencies of the latter. Regarding investor-State proceedings, a
possible strategy aimed at protecting the autonomy of EU law could
be to institutionalize the intervention of the Commission for all
disputes so that it may act as a privileged (and authentic) interpreter
of EU law in all cases brought before the tribunal when interpreting
EU law is the precondition for the settlement of a dispute. Of course,
it remains to be seen whether the CJEU would accept this mechanism,
considering that in this case the Commission (rather than the Court)
217. See Daniele Gallo, From Autonomy to Full Deference in the Relationship between
the EFTA Court and the ECJ: The Case of the International Exhaustion of the Rights
Conferred by a Trademark 4, (Eur. U. Inst, Working Paper No. 78, 2010); see generally
Agreement on the European Economic Area, 1994 O.J. L 1 [hereinafter EEA Agreement].
218. The principle/objective of “legal homogeneity” is envisaged in paragraphs 4 and 15
of the Preamble and in Articles 1, 6, 105, 106, 107, 111 of the EEA Agreement, supra note
217, 1994 O.J. L 1, and in Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Agreement Between the EFTA States
on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice, 1994 O.J. L 344,
according to which EEA law aims at creating a dynamic and homogeneous area by extending
EC rules—EU rules as foreseen by the Treaty of Lisbon—to a wider regional context.
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would exercise the interpretative monopoly. It is clear that the
introduction of a prior involvement of the CJEU or the Commission
in the interpretation of EU law would lead or, de facto, force the EU
institutions to grant a similar right to the EU’s co-contracting parties,
or better, their constitutional or supreme courts.219
In conclusion, there seems to be another legal tool to be used in
order to safeguard the principle of EU autonomy. In the 2015 TTIP
Proposal,220 as well as in the CETA 2016221 and in the EU-Vietnam
FTA222 it is stated that Parties (the EU and its partners), through the
committees provided therein, where serious concerns arise as regards
matters of interpretation of provisions on investment protection and
resolution of disputes, “may adopt decisions interpreting those
provisions”, which are binding on both the Tribunal and the Appeal
Tribunal. This provision, therefore, cannot apply to a particular case
brought before the permanent tribunals; yet it may apply pro futuro in
order for the EU to clarify provisions to be applicable in settling
disputes between investors and the Parties of the agreement so that
conflicts with the EU legal order might be considerably reduced.
III. WHAT ROLE SHOULD STATE-TO-STATE ARBITRATION AND
(GREATER) INCLUSIVE ADJUDICATION PLAY IN EU FREE
TRADE AND INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS?
A. State-to-State Arbitration between Diplomatic Protection and
Interpretive Claims and its Relationship with Investor-State Dispute
Resolution Systems
We have explained why, in our opinion, State-to-State
arbitration should not be the only remedy available under EU FTAs.
As already noted, this does not mean that State-to-State arbitration
ought to be abandoned and replaced by investor-State arbitration or
permanent tribunals.223 Rather, as argued below, its inclusion in EU
agreements can only be beneficial. Therefore, this mechanism should
be envisaged in addition to, and not as a replacement for, investorState adjudication. As a consequence, this Section will also
219.
220.
221.
222.

See Schill, supra note 164, at 386.
See 2015 TTIP Proposal, Ch. II, supra note 3, art. 13, ¶ 5.
See CETA, supra note 3, art. 8.31, ¶ 3.
See EU-Viet. Free Trade Agreement, Ch. II of Ch. 8, Sect. 3, supra note 3, art. 16, ¶

4.
223. See supra Section I.A.
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investigate possible strategies for ensuring an effective coordination
between the two mechanisms in question. As it has been already
noted in the previous Sections, this analysis, albeit being mostly
devoted to investor-State arbitration, may apply also to CETA 2016
and EU-Vietnam FTA. “May” since there is no praxis at the
international level through which identifying the rules governing the
relationship between State-to-State arbitration and the functions
performed by permanent tribunals. What can be inferred from the
reading of both CETA 2016 and the EU-Vietnam FTA is that the erga
omnes (de jure or de facto) effect of awards that are generally
rendered by international permanent tribunals is excluded in both
agreements, as mentioned in the previous Section.224 In CETA 2016,
for instance, it is laid down that “[a]n award issued pursuant to this
Section shall be binding between the disputing parties and in respect
of that particular case.”225 Therefore, as there seems not to exist
relevant differences with the legal force of investor-State arbitration
awards, the coordination mechanism concerning investor-State
arbitration and inter-State arbitration may represent a source of
inspiration, mutatis mutandis, also for agreements that envisage a
system of permanent tribunals.
It must be pointed out that earlier BITs, modeled on Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation Treaties, originally provided for State-toState arbitration, while investor-State arbitration clauses began to be
introduced only in later BITs.226 More specifically, it was not until
1969, with the Chad-Italy BIT, that the first investor-State arbitration
clause was included in a treaty, and not until 1990 that a tribunal
asserted its jurisdiction in a dispute between an investor and a host
State.227 Indeed, diplomatic protection as conceived in the 1950s and
1960s was the only mechanism that allowed States to take action to
protect their nationals on the level of (public) international law, a
sphere from which, at the time, non-State actors were excluded by
definition. Due to this exclusion, the system of adjudication of
224. Article 30 of the 2015 TTIP Proposal, instead, follows a different approach. See
supra Section II.B.
225. See CETA, supra note 3, art. 8.41, ¶ 1; EU-Viet. Free Trade Agreement, Ch. II of
Ch. 8, Sect. 3, supra note 3, art. 31(1).
226. For an historical overview see Roberts, supra note 38, at 2-5. For an overview of
inter-State dispute settlement systems contained in BITs, see Paul Peters, Dispute Settlement
Arrangements in Investment Treaties, NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 91, 102–17 (1991).
BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER,
STATE–STATE
DISPUTE
227. See
NATHALIE
SETTLEMENT IN INVESTMENT TREATIES: BEST PRACTICES SERIES––2014 1 (2014).
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disputes of alien investors in a foreign State faced a serious problem
that could only be resolved through the fictio of diplomatic protection,
which, by treating a violation of the rights of a foreign national as a
violation of the rights of their State of nationality, allowed the latter to
vindicate that violation at the international level.228
Today, nearly all modern BITs include provisions that give
access to two avenues of dispute resolution, each with a different
scope of ratione personae: a State-to-State clause for disputes
concerning the interpretation and/or application of the treaty, and an
investor-State arbitration clause to be activated in case of a violation
of the treaty by the host State if the investor concerned has suffered
loss or damage as a result of the violation. A good example of a
typical BIT State-to-State dispute settlement clause can be found in
the 2012 US Model BIT, whose Article 37 reads: “any dispute
between the Parties concerning the interpretation or application of
this Treaty, that is not resolved through consultations or other
diplomatic channels, shall be submitted on the request of either Party
to arbitration for a binding decision or award by a tribunal in
accordance with applicable rules of international law” (emphasis
added).229 Under many treaties, however, a State can initiate a claim
against another State on matters concerning the “interpretation and
application” of the treaty.230 Thus, in case of disputes that have not
been resolved through consultations or other diplomatic channels,
claims may be brought to obtain an interpretation or, in the context of
diplomatic protection, to seek the application of the treaty should a
violation of any of its provisions be alleged by a contracting party and
redress be sought by said party on behalf of its investors. While the
purpose of diplomatic protection, like that of investor-State arbitration
clauses,231 is to protect nationals abroad (including investors) and
obtain reparations for internationally wrongful acts, interpretive
claims have a different goal. Rather than reparations and damages,
228. Greg Lourie, Diplomatic Protection Under the State-to-State Arbitration Clauses of
Investment Treaties, AUS. Y.B. INT’L ARB. 511, 511 (2015). For a general discussion of this
theme see GIORGIO SACERDOTI, BILATERAL TREATIES AND MULTILATERAL INVESTMENTS
ON INVESTMENT PROTECTION 261-65 (1997).
229. 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art 37, ¶1, available at
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf.
230. See German Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 9, available at
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/archive/ita1025.pdf.
On
the
notions
of
“interpretation” and “application” see Roberts, supra note 38.
231. See NATHALIE BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER, supra note 227, at 3-4.
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they simply seek clarification of the meaning and/or scope of treaty
obligations – which is not always a precondition for determining a
treaty breach.
As already emphasized above,232 the boundaries between the
concepts of “interpretation” and “application” are blurred as any
dispute on the application of a treaty necessarily presupposes an
interpretation of the provisions to be applied. However, although the
application of a norm implies by its very nature the interpretation of
that norm, the reverse, while relatively common, is not always the
case. Indeed, the contracting parties to a treaty may well seek
clarification of the meaning of one or more provisions that are
unrelated to a specific situation or to a dispute regarding the violation
of the treaty itself. Moreover, it should be noted for the sake of
completeness that diplomatic protection claims are not the only type
of claims that could be brought in connection with a dispute
concerning the application of an investment treaty.233 In fact, a State
could seek purely declaratory relief, acknowledging that the other
party has violated the agreement. This does not mean, however, that
there is a clear-cut distinction between diplomatic protection and
declaratory relief claims; when a State requests adjudication on
alleged violations of the rights of its nationals committed by the other
contracting party, the assessment and determination of whether the
latter has breached its obligations under the treaty is an inevitable task
to be performed.234 For this reason, and since to our knowledge there
is as yet no clear case law on claims for declaratory relief, our
discussion will focus on the more crucial distinction between
diplomatic protection and interpretive claims.235
With regard to both types of claims, it appears that despite being
frequently provided for in modern-day BITs and FTAs, State-to-State
arbitration has actually been used as a dispute resolution mechanism
only in three cases: Italy v. Cuba236 (a diplomatic protection claim
232.
233.
234.
235.

See Roberts, supra note 38, at 3.
See Lourie, supra note 228, at 514.
Id.
In her discussion of declaratory relief claims, NATHALIE BERNASCONIOSTERWALDER, supra note 227, at 15 (citing, among other cases, Mexico v. United States (in
the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services), NAFTA Chapter 20 State-to-State Arbitration,
Final Report of the Panel, February 6, 2001, paras. 15-24).
236. See Republic of Italy v. Republic of Cuba, Ad hoc Arbitration, Interim Award, 15
March 2005; see also Republic of Italy v. Republic of Cuba, Ad hoc Arbitration, Final Award,
15 January 2008; see also Michele Potestà, Interstate Arbitration––Bilateral Investment
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concerning the application of the treaty), Peru v. Chile,237 and
Ecuador v. United States238 (interpretive claims). Notwithstanding the
small number of cases, it cannot be denied that the existence of these
relatively recent disputes, as well as the current practice of States
regarding investment dispute resolution systems provided for in BITs
and FTAs, signals a trend towards a revaluation and re-emergence of
State-to-State arbitration, given the concerns raised by investor-State
arbitration. Indeed, some States have recently decided not to include
an investor-State clause, opting instead for a State-to-State remedy.239
Turning now to an analysis of the European context and EU law,
it is important to recall that no case concerning the agreements
concluded by individual Member States with third countries has yet
been decided under State-to-State dispute settlement provisions.240 As
for FTAs, containing investment chapters, that were negotiated so far,
but not yet in force pending finalization of the text by the
Commission, final approval by the Parliament and Council and/or
completion of ratification procedures by Member States (such as,
inter alia, CETA 2016,241 FTA with Singapore,242 and FTA with
Vietnam243), it is possible to infer that they all contain a chapter on
State-to-State arbitration, which is applicable also to investment
disputes. In most agreements, indeed, it is specified that an investor of
a contracting party may submit his claim against the host State
“[w]ithout prejudice to the rights and obligations of the Parties” under
the chapter on Dispute Settlement.244 In light of this, it seems quite
probable that other agreements under negotiation will provide for a
Treaties––Diplomatic Protection––Exhaustion of Local Remedies––Definition of Investment,
106 AM. J. INT’L L 341 (2012); Giorgio Sacerdoti, & Matilde Recanati, Approaches to
Investment Protection Outside of Specific International Investment Agreements and InvestorState Settlement, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 1839-62 (Marc Bungenberg, Jörn
Griebel, Stephan Hobe, & August Reinisch eds., 2015).
237. See Empresas Lucchetti, S.A. and Luchetti Peru, S.A. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/4, (Feb. 7, 2005).
238. See Republic of Ecuador v. U.S., PCA Case No. 2012-5 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2012). See
in particular, Jarrod Wong, The Subversion of State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration, 53
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 6, 10-14, 27-30 (2014).
239. See, e.g., Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of the Philippines for an
Economic Partnership Agreement (2006) and Malaysia-Australia Free Trade Agreement
(2012); see also BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER, supra note 227, at 1.
240. See Is Investor-State Dispute Settlement, supra note 74, at 660.
241. See CETA, supra note 3, Ch. 29.
242. See EU-Singapore FTA, supra note 69, at Chapter 15.
243. See EU-Viet. FTA, supra note 3, at “Dispute Settlement.”
244. See CETA, supra note 3, art. 8.18.
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similar mechanism. Therefore, in line with the rule of customary
international law245 that a direct claim of an individual may co-exist
with the right of his home State to espouse a claim, the EU has chosen
not to regard the inclusion of an investor-State system of dispute
settlement in FTAs as a means to rule out inter-State arbitration. This
is certainly a reasonable choice, since a hybrid system that includes
both remedies seems to be the best solution to reach a fair balance
between the interests of the State and the investors, one which has the
advantage of responding to the concerns that (more or less recently)
have been raised in relation to investor-State arbitration.
There are several reasons why State-to-State arbitration –
foreseen in addition to investor-State remedies – may offer a useful
remedy for settling certain disagreements between the EU and its
trade partners and/or, in general, for clarifying certain treaty
provisions. With regard to claims brought in the context of diplomatic
protection, it might be an appealing option for investors when they
fear discrimination or retaliation by a host State if they initiate
investor-State arbitration proceedings. In addition, small investors
who wish to avoid the expenses of bringing a direct claim against the
host State may prefer that their case be brought by their home State.
This holds true especially when injuries concern numerous investors
and could lead to class actions.246
A State-to-State dispute resolution system seems even more
attractive for the EU, its Member States, third-country partners, and
investors when we consider it from the view of interpretive claims. In
this case, since what is at stake is the adjudication of a dispute
between an investor and a host State on treaty provisions that are not
directly connected with the application of substantive standards, the
rationale for the inclusion of State-to-State arbitration rests on a
number of observations. Rather than having a variety of rulings by
different tribunals on specific investment disputes, the mechanism of
State-to-State interpretive claims would ensure interpretive authority
and thus make it possible to resolve uncertainties as to the meaning,
scope, and extent of the rights and obligations of States towards one
other and investors. These claims could be used by the EU institutions
and/or EU Member States and treaty partners to shed light on the
245. As stated in the Commentary to Article 16 of the International Law Commission’s
Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, “the customary international law rules on diplomatic
protection and the rules governing the protection of human rights are complementary.”
246. See Roberts, supra note 38, at 14-15.
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content and limits of one or more provisions, especially where
interpretation may potentially have an impact on numerous investors
in the host State. In this perspective, State-to-State arbitration could
help reduce the proliferation of far-fetched claims that have a limited
chance of success. From the point of view of the host State, it could
serve as a tool for determining whether a certain measure is
compatible with the treaty: a single ruling would be a much better
solution than facing multiple investment claims. Moreover, on
interpretive claims, the EU and its partners should make clear in the
agreements that the concept of “dispute” as a prerequisite for
initiating State-to-State arbitration proceedings is to be understood in
a broad sense, that is, as comprising both disagreement between the
parties and silence or failure to respond to a request for a joint
interpretation.247 This seems necessary especially in light of recent
case law, namely the Ecuador v. United States248 ruling, in which the
tribunal observed that there was no “dispute” because there was no
“positive opposition” by a party against another on the interpretation
of the treaty.249
Regarding the more operational yet crucial issue of how best to
ensure an effective coordination between investor-State arbitration
and State-to-State arbitration250 in EU free trade and investment
247. See also Clovis J. Trevino, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration and the
Interplay with Investor–State Arbitration Under the Same Treaty, 5 J. INT’L DISP.
SETTLEMENT, 2014, 199, 202-04. On the ambiguous meaning of “dispute,” see Christoph
Schreuer, What is a Legal Dispute?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW BETWEEN UNIVERSALISM AND
FRAGMENTATION: FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOUR OF GERHARD HAFNER 959-60 (Isabelle Buffard,
James Crawford, Alain Pellet, & Stephan Wittich eds., 2008).
248. See Republic of Ecuador v. United States of America (PCA Case No. 2012-5),
http://www.italaw.com/cases/1494#sthash.R0ecUZCV.dpuf.
249. See Jarrod Hepburn & Luke Eric Peterson, US-Ecuador Inter-State Investment
Treaty Award Released to Parties; Tribunal Members Part Ways on Key Issues, INV. ARB.
REP. (Oct. 30, 2012), https://www.iareporter.com/articles/us-ecuador-inter-state-investmenttreaty-award-released-to-parties-tribunal-members-part-ways-on-key-issues/.
250. On such relationship, see Michele Potestà, State-to-State Dispute Settlement
Pursuant to Bilateral Investment Treaties: Is There Potential?, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 761-65 (Nerina Boschiero, Tullio
Scovazzi, Cesare Pitea, & Chiara Ragni eds., 2013); Michele Potestà, Towards a Greater Role
for State-to-State Arbitration in the Architecture of Investment Treaties?, in THE ROLE OF THE
STATE IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 264-71 (Shaheeza Lalani & Rodrigo Polanco Lazo
eds. 2015) [hereinafter Towards a Greater Role For State-to-State Arbitration]; Ben
Juratowitch, supra note 38, at 22-35 (2008); Chang-fa Lo, Relations and Possible Interactions
between State-State Dispute Settlement and Investor-State Arbitration Under Bits, 6
CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 1, 10-26 (2013); Greg Lourie, supra note 228; BERNASCONIOSTERWALDER, supra note 227; Roberts, supra note 38; Trevino, supra note 247.
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agreements,251 it should be noted that there are neither precise rules
under customary law nor general investment treaties that give a clear
indication of how the two mechanisms interrelate.252 Clear solutions
are even less feasible when innovative, permanent investor-State
dispute settlement systems are at stake. As anticipated above, the
analysis will be focused, in particular, on investor-State arbitration in
their interplay with State-to-State arbitration.
Most BITs do not contain any provision on the interplay between
State-to-State arbitration and investor-State arbitration and are silent
as to whether the latter should be prioritized over the former.253
Moreover, it is important to point out that the rule of exhaustion of
local remedies, defined by the International Court of Justice as a
“well-established rule of customary international law,”254 applies
within the framework of inter-State arbitration only in the case of a
diplomatic protection claim.255 Indeed, the rule does not have the
status of customary law with respect to other inter-State claims.256
Although we cannot speak of a potential conflict between Stateto-State arbitration and investor-State arbitration, or of competing
jurisdiction in the strict sense (the “disputes” are not the same; they
are between different parties, have different objects, and are based on
different legal grounds), the lack of clear rules on their interaction
may entail a number of tensions between parallel or subsequent
proceedings and lead to inconsistency due to conflicting decisions. In
order to avoid such tensions, it is our belief that EU FTAs should
contain rules to govern the proceedings.

251. Although outside the scope of this article, an interesting issue is that of recourse to
WTO law as a new form of diplomatic protection in parallel with investment arbitration. See
Titi, supra note 32, at 265-87.
252. See Lo, supra note 250, at 4. But see Article 13.12 of the China-New Zealand BIT,
Agreement between the Government of New Zealand and the Government of the People’s
Republic of China on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Nov. 22 1988, 1787 UNTS
186.
253. Contra Wong, supra note 238, at 13-14, 33-48.
254. Interhandel (Switzerland v. United States of America), Judgment of March 21,
1959, ICJ Rep 6, at 25.
255. As demonstrated by the award rendered by the Tribunal in Republic of It. v.
Republic of Cuba, Sentence Préliminaire, [Interim Award] (Ad Hoc Arb. Trib. Mar. 15, 2005)
(Fr.); Republic of It. v. Republic of Cuba, Sentence finale [Final Award ] (Ad Hoc Arb. Trib.
Jan. 15, 2008) (Fr.).
256. See also Potestà, State-to-State Dispute Settlement Pursuant to Bilateral Investment
Treaties: Is There Potential?, supra note 250, at 252-53, 259-64.
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In order to address the matter of coordination,257 the timing of
the inter-State remedial channel vis-à-vis the investor-State
proceedings should be taken into account.258 In its turn, this factor
must be considered in relation to another crucial element: the nature
of the claim as diplomatic protection or interpretive.259
With regard to diplomatic protection claims, it is our opinion
that agreements should include a provision modeled on Article
27(1)260 of the ICSID Convention,261 which reads:
No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection, or bring an
international claim, in respect of a dispute which one of its
nationals and another Contracting State shall have consented to
submit or shall have submitted to arbitration under this
Convention, unless such other Contracting State shall have failed
to abide by and comply with the award rendered in such
dispute.262

Put differently, this means that if an investor has consented to
submit or has already submitted a dispute by using the investor-State
mechanism, the investor’s home State may not initiate a State-to-State
diplomatic protection claim unless the host State fails to abide by the
arbitral award. Thus, this provision would protect the host State from
the risk of multiple simultaneous claims. As for cases where the
investor-State award has already been rendered, the provision should
specify that the investor’s home State may not institute State-to-State
257. On the relevance of the good faith principle, see Lo, supra note 250.
258. Contra Wong, supra note 238, at 35-46. The author maintains the priority of
investor-State arbitration over State-to-State arbitration. In particular, he argues that the two
arbitral regimes should be treated as mutually exclusive, precluding State-to-State arbitration
of any dispute that may be properly resolved through investor-state arbitration.
259. See Potestà, Towards a Greater Role for State-to-State Arbitration, supra note 250;
see also Roberts, supra note 38, at 66-68 (analyzing claims for declaratory relief); Lourie,
supra note 228, at 515.
260. For an analysis of this provision in light of the most recent case law, see Wong,
supra note 238, at 30-35.
261. Of course, if the parties to the agreement chose the ICSID framework, the problem
would be solved ex ante, whereas if they chose UNICTRAL or other systems which lack a
provision similar to Article 27, that would lead to considerable uncertainty. This is why the
best solution seems to be the insertion of a norm that regulates the matter. As foreseen in
CETA, supra note 3, art. 8.23, ¶ 2: “A claim may be submitted under the following rules: the
ICSID Convention; the ICSID Additional Facility Rules where the conditions for proceedings
pursuant to paragraph (a) do not apply; the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; or any other
arbitration rules on agreement of the disputing parties.”
262. This model has been adopted in some BITs, such as the Agreement between the UK
and Mexico for the promotion and reciprocal protection of investments, signed on May 12,
2006.
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proceedings for the purpose of exercising diplomatic protection
except, once again, where the respondent State fails to abide by the
arbitral award. On the other hand, where the investor has neither
submitted nor consented to submit a dispute, the diplomatic protection
claim may be pursued even in the absence of specific provisions on its
interplay with investor-State arbitration. Indeed, as observed by Ben
Juratowitch, “exhaustion of international, as opposed to domestic,
remedies is certainly not a prerequisite to diplomatic protection.”263
With regard to interpretive claims, EU free trade and investment
agreements should include a provision clarifying: (1) whether, and to
what extent, parallel or subsequent proceedings (investor-State and
State-to-State) could be undertaken, and (2) the legal effect of a
tribunal’s award on the other tribunal. The first situation is where a
party initiates inter-State arbitration proceedings, the tribunal renders
the award, and then an investor-State tribunal is called upon to rely on
the same provision under examination by the inter-State tribunal, thus
interpreting it, in order to assess whether there has been a violation of
the treaty. In this case, the investor-State tribunal will have to read the
award for purposes of treaty interpretation, thus recognizing its
binding character. This means that the award is to be considered
binding on treaty parties, investors, and future State-to-State and
investor-State tribunals. Therefore, its legal effect is very similar to
that of a joint interpretive agreement between the treaty parties. As
noted by the International Court of Justice, “an agreement as to the
interpretation of a provision reached after the conclusion of the treaty
represents an authentic interpretation by the parties which must be
read into the treaty for purposes of its interpretation.”264 Therefore,
EU FTAs may contain a clause under which a decision on the
interpretation of treaty provisions delivered by a State-to-State arbitral
tribunal must be binding not only on the contracting parties to the
treaty, but also on investor-State tribunals if these are called upon to
adjudicate a dispute requiring an interpretation of the same treaty
provisions.265 Such a clause would ensure greater certainty and

263. Juratowitch, supra note 38, at 35.
264. Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia), Judgment, 1999,
I.C.J. 1045, at 1075 (Dec. 1999); see also Roberts, supra note 38, at 60-61.
265. Of course, the legal effect of an interpretive award will depend on the text of the
relevant free trade and investment treaty. Anthea Roberts speaks of highly persuasive effects.
See Roberts, supra note 38, at 59-63.
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consistency by creating a binding erga omnes effect and acting as a
legal precedent.
The second situation is where a party files a purely interpretive
claim and, before an award is rendered, an investor files an
investment claim whose resolution requires an interpretation of the
same treaty provision. EU FTAs should contain a provision stating
that the investor-State tribunal has to stay proceedings and await the
interpretation to be rendered by the inter-State tribunal. As a
consequence, the investor-State tribunal should give primacy to a
State-to-State tribunal entrusted with the authority to resolve disputes
about the interpretation of the treaty. In the case of an inter-State
claim filed after the commencement of investor-State proceedings,
but before the deliverance of the award, the agreements should
request that the tribunal order a stay of proceedings. Of course, no
problems would arise in the case of a State-to-State claim filed by a
contracting party dissatisfied with the interpretation given by the
investor-State tribunal in its award. As confirmed in most agreements,
the award rendered by the investor-State tribunal is binding and
becomes res judicata. It is essential that agreements are designed in
such a way as to prevent the risk that State-to-State arbitration may be
used to call into question the finality of awards and the duty of the
host State to implement them, or that it may be employed to litigate
issues for a second time, generating an additional burden in terms of
time and money.
All of the above must be distinguished from the question of
participation as amicus curiae of the non-disputing Treaty State party
in investor-State proceedings.266 Just as there should be no room for
the investor’s home State exercising diplomatic protection, home
State submissions on questions of treaty interpretation should be
foreseen in EU FTAs, representing an important contribution to a
better decision-making process.267 The provision contained in CETA
2016 is welcomed and should be replicated in other agreements,
266. For an insightful analysis (including some observations on the possible intervention
of non-disputing State party not merely as amicus curiae), see Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler,
Non-Disputing State Submissions in Investment Arbitration: Resurgence of Diplomatic
Protection?, in DIPLOMATIC AND JUDICIAL MEANS OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, 307-26
(Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Marcelo Kohen, & Jorge E. Viñuales, eds., 2012).
267. Examples of treaties that allow for the participation of non-disputing parties include
the NAFTA, CAFTA and some national model BITS—those of the US and Canada, for
instance—or BITs, such as the US-Chile FTA (2003), Art. 10.19(2), and US-Singapore FTA
(2003), Art. 15.19(2).
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whether the investor-State system of dispute settlement will imply
arbitration mechanisms or be modeled on ICS. Article 8.38 of the
CETA reads as follows:
The Tribunal shall accept or, after consultation with the disputing
parties, may invite, oral or written submissions from the nondisputing Party regarding the interpretation of the Agreement.
The non-disputing Party may attend a hearing held under this
Section. […] The Tribunal shall ensure that the disputing parties
are given a reasonable opportunity to present their observations
on a submission by the non-disputing Party to the Agreement.268

Finally, our observations on the inclusion of State-to-State
arbitration in EU FTAs, as well as on their coordination, should also
be read in light of Section II of this article, which discusses the
clashes between external systems of dispute resolution and the CJEU.
In other words, inter-State arbitration could represent a successful
remedy for settling disputes and/or interpreting provisions of the
agreements in question provided that the principle of autonomy of the
EU, namely of the CJEU, is respected. Mechanisms apt at securing
the respect of such principle, like a system of prior involvement of
EU institutions, are even more important when confronted with Stateto-State arbitration; suffice to take into account the Mox Plant ruling,
mentioned above, as well as the opinions rendered by the CJEU on
external inter-State remedies envisaged in the agreements concluded
by the EU. In particular, the respect of the autonomy of EU legal
order becomes essential in the context of State-to-State interpretive
claims in which tribunals, rather than adjudicating single disputes and
assessing whether compensation must be awarded, are empowered to
exercise purely interpretive functions in relation to a free trade and
investment treaty, functions which may frequently require – even
more than those performed by investment tribunals adjudicating a
specific dispute – an interpretation of EU law.269
B. From Arbitral Tribunals toward Transformative Adjudication
In CETA 2016 and EU-Vietnam FTA the EU, along with the
third countries concerned, has reaffirmed the same commitment
expressed in TTIP toward a system of permanent investment

268. CETA, supra note 3, arts. 8.38(2) and (4).
269. For our extensive discussion, see supra Section II.B.

2016] EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF EU INVESTMENT LAW

1147

tribunals.270 The qualifications, approximate salaries, and ethical rules
that apply to judges are spelled out in the EU position for the TTIP
negotiation and clearly influences the EU-Vietnam FTA and CETA
2016. In these two important agreements271 the judicial architecture
varies in terms of structure even though there is a similar underlying
rationale, namely to redress some of the fundamental flaws of the
investment arbitration systems expressed by lawyers and civil society
alike with respect to the four pillars of public law adjudication:
accountability, coherence, independence and openness.272 As Cecilia
Malmström said proudly after the adoption of CETA in 2016, “[b]y
making the system work like an international court, these changes
will ensure that citizens can trust it to deliver fair and objective
judgments.”273 This statement has a twofold function: for the
Commission to influence its US counterparts and even more
ambitiously transform CETA 2016 and EU-Vietnam tribunal into a
multilateral investment court that will eventually eliminate the
tribunals.
Some lawyers and scholars alike have already expressed their
skepticism toward these investment tribunals because of the
overstated benefits of greater coherence and effectiveness in
protecting investors through an appeal mechanisms as well as the
belief that judges are per se more independent and objective than
arbitrators in their legal reasoning.274 It remains undisputed that the

270. See Cecilia Malström, EU Trade Comm’r, Proposing an Investment Court System
(Sept. 10, 2015), http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/malmstrom/blog/proposinginvestment-court-system_en. For an explanation of her, achievement: “Today, I’ve presented a
major change in our trade and investment policy. I’m proposing to set up a modern and
transparent system for resolving disputes between investors and states—an Investment Court
System . . . . Some have argued that the traditional ISDS model is private justice. What I’m
setting out here is a public justice system—just like those we’re familiar with in our own
countries, and the international courts which Europe has so actively promoted in the past.” Id.
271. See CETA, supra note 3, at art. 8.27-8.28; EU-Viet. FTA, supra note 3, art. 12-13.
272. See GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 153
(2007).
273. See Press Release, CETA: EU and Canada Agree on New Approach on Investment
in Trade Agreement, (Feb, 29, 2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=
1468; Barrie McKenna, Canada, EU Revise Trade Deal, Add Investor-State Dispute Tribunal,
THE GLOBE AND MAIL, (Feb. 29, 2016, 9:53AM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-onbusiness/industry-news/the-law-page/ottawa-says-legal-review-of-canada-eu-free-trade-dealcompleted/article28946075/.
274. See Barrie McKenna, Canada, EU Revise Trade Deal, Add Investor-State Dispute
Tribunal, GLOBE & MAIL (Feb. 29, 2016, 9:53 AM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/reporton-business/industry-news/the-law-page/ottawa-says-legal-review-of-canada-eu-free-trade-
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ambitious judicial architecture put forward by the EU in both CETA
2016 and its Vietnam FTA for investment tribunals has deep
transformative ambitions. From an institutional perspective a future
multilateral investment court aims to replace the various investment
tribunals envisaged for every FTA.275 In substance it remains to be
seen whether this new adjudication system transforms the practice
and the outcomes of international investment law in a more
democratic and egalitarian direction.276 In light of this transformative
ideal, the underlying political economy of the international
investment treaty regime shows not only the benefits in protecting
foreign investors but also how the costs of pollution and labor
violations are easily shifted from the investors to the local
communities of the host State.
However, this transformative adjudication model proposal is not
merely utopian. Take for instance the letter from Berndt Lange, the
MEP chairing the International Trade Committee in the European
Parliament to Malmstrom in 2015. Welcoming the TTIP proposal on
the Investment Court System Lange reiterates that sustainable
development and corporate social responsibility provisions should be
mainstreamed throughout the investment chapter.277
Along the same line, many environmental and sustainability
advocates have long asked for more transparency in large investments
in land for forestry, agriculture, or extractive projects that are often
agreed to in secrecy, eliminating the voice of the affected
communities. These advocates have asked for greater transparency,
participation and disclosure to the affected communities in the
processes before the government is about to grant the concession to
the foreign investors.278 Not surprisingly, many of these cases have
not found avenues for redress before domestic courts for many

deal-completed/article28946075/; Susan Franck, Inside the Arbitrator’s Mind. EMORY L.J.
(forthcoming 2016) (with James Freda, et al.).
275. See CETA, supra note 3, arts. 8.27-8.28; EU-Viet. FTA, supra note 3, arts. 12-13.
276. See generally Karl Klare, Legal Culture & Transformative Constitutionalism, 14 S.
AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 146, 146-88 (1998).
277. See Letter from Bern Lange, Chair of Comm. on Int’l Trade, to Cecilia Malstrom,
Eur. Comm’r for Trade (Nov. 11, 2015), https://ec.europa.eu/carol/indexiframe.cfm?fuseaction=download&documentId=090166e5a201630f&title=CM_signed.pdf.
278. See Transparency in Land-Based Investment: Key Questions and Next Steps,
COLUM. CTR. SUSTAINABLE INV. 4 (Mar. 2016), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2016/03/201603-11-CCSI-OCP_Transparency-in-Land-Based-Investment_FINAL.pdf.
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reasons, including the fact that foreign investors often represent a
source of wealth for the host governments.
Local communities, however, have brought some of these cases
against the States that negotiated without respecting indigenous or
communal property rights before international human rights courts.279
For instance, before the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (IACHR) petitioners used the right of information and
transparency in the decision of the Haitian government to attract
tourism and the mining industry to Haiti, communities sought redress
for human rights violations by the extractive industries in Latin
America on both peasants and indigenous communities whose health
conditions have deteriorated due to the pollution created by the
foreign investors to the air, water, and environment.280
While foreign investors have access to international investment
courts against the host State when it is in violation of environmental,
human rights, labor, or corporate social responsibility norms affecting
local communities, indigenous people and workers have limited
remedies against these tortious actions by foreign investors. Despite
the exceptional case of the US, in which federal courts have redressed
these violations through the Alien Tort Statute, this avenue has been
severely precluded by the recent Kiobel jurisprudence of the US
Supreme Court.281
In his utopian proposal, Lance Compa argues that TPP
represents a possibility to create a truly transformative adjudication
mechanism to enforce labor, environmental and consumer protection
standards in international trade and investment agreements.282 Compa

279. See generally S. James Anaya & Maia S. Campbell, Gaining Legal Recognition of
Indigenous Land Rights: The Story of the Awas Tingni Case in Nicaragua, in HUMAN RIGHTS
ADVOCACY STORIES 117 (Deena R. Hurwitz & Margaret L. Satterthwaite eds., 2009); S.
James Anaya & Claudio Grossman, The Case of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua: A New Step in the
International Law of Indigenous Peoples, 19 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 15 (2002).
280. See Marie Durané, Situation of the Right to Access to Information in Haiti, HUM.
RTS. BRIEF (Mar. 19, 2015), http://hrbrief.org/2015/03/situation-of-the-right-to-access-toinformation-in-haiti/; Marie Durane, Human Rights and Extractive Industries in Latin
America, HUM. RTS. BRIEF, (Mar. 21, 2015), http://hrbrief.org/2015/03/human-rights-andextractive-industries-in-latin-america/.
281. Vivian Grosswald Curran & David L. Sloss, Reviving Human Rights Litigation
After Kiobel, 107 AMER J. INT’L L. 858 (2013).
282. See Lance Compa, How to Make the Trans-Pacific Partnership Work for Workers
and Communities, NATION (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.thenation.com/article/how-to-makethe-trans-pacific-partnership-work-for-workers-and-communities/.
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envisages a more egalitarian system of redress for human right, labor
and environmental violations:
Consider instead creating an innovative alternative system to
enforce trade agreements’ labor, environmental, and consumerprotection provisions. Let the same door open to investors
wronged by governments swing open for workers and
communities harmed by investors. Give civil-society forces the
power to bring multinational corporations before a neutral
arbitral panel to seek damages for violations of labor rights,
environmental standards, consumer protections, and human rights
that relevant chapters of the trade agreement purport to guarantee
and protect.283

Clearly, Compa goes further than the European Parliament not
only by mainstreaming environmental sustainability and corporate
social responsibility norms but also by creating more equal access to
international adjudication for investors as well as workers and local
communities. As he puts it “Addressing inequality without fear of
investors’ challenges” 284 should be one of the priorities of a
transformative investment regime in countries where rising
inequalities triggered by NAFTA in the US and by the increasing
income disparities among European economies. Compa’s proposal is
that investment arbitration should not interfere with some
governmental measures such as setting national minimum wages,
guaranteeing the “prevailing wage” in publicly funded project and
setting health and safety standards higher than national ones.285
In taking an economic development perspective, Roberto
Echandi has warned against the escalation of costly litigation in
international investment arbitration. Rather than on courts, Echandi
focuses on alternative dispute resolution policies and mechanisms that
could provide less litigious remedies without going to court.286 A
well-known challenge to the system of investment treaty arbitration is
that several developing countries like Argentina and Ecuador have
denounced and abandoned the ICSID system in the attempt to create a
new regional model within Mercosur. As a result, the engagement
283. See id.
284. See Lance Compa, Labor Rights and Labor Standards in Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Negotiations: A US Perspective, 49 ECONOMIA & LAVORO 87, 88 (2015).
285. Id. at 89.
286. See Roberto Echandi, Towards a New Approach to Address Investor-State Conflict:
Developing a Conceptual Framework for Dispute Prevention (NCCR Trade Reg. Swiss Nat’l
Ctr. of Competence in Res., Working Paper No. 46, 2011).
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between arbitration and law and development scholars led to
questioning and further reassessing the outcomes of investment
arbitration in terms of greater procedural fairness287 or in creating new
adjudication models in South-South relations.288
CONCLUSION
EU trade negotiators have changed the international architecture
for the protection of foreign investors through by moving away from
a traditional ISDS model and adopting instead a permanent court
system with procedural due process guarantees: the ICS. The open
question remains, however, whether beyond such procedural
innovation also substantive aspirations lie behind the agenda of EU
trade negotiators to promote a truly transformative trade and
investment regime in their recently negotiated FTAs,289 rather than
simply responding to external and internal political and legal
pressures. These include the clashes between EU law and
international arbitration as well as the need to safeguard the principle
of autonomy of the EU legal order as interpreted by the CJEU’s
jurisprudence. The new agreements of CETA 2016 and the EUVietnam FTA with the creation of permanent investment tribunals
and appellate mechanisms demonstrate that EU negotiators have put
forward a consistent transformative approach toward international
trade and investment regimes that can reinforce their negotiating
positions vis à vis the U.S. in TTIP, on which the USTR remains
lukewarm on the ICS.290
While welcoming the ICS as a procedural departure from the
traditional ISDS regime, in this article we suggest a new role for the
underemphasized State-to-State arbitration and we suggest
287. See Susan Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50
HARV. INT’L L.J. 435 (2009).
288. See Roberto Echandi, What Do Developing Countries Expect from the International
Investment Regime?, in THE EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME:
EXPECTATIONS, REALITIES, OPTIONS 3-21, 6 (Jose E. Alvarez, Karl P. Sauvant, Kamil Girard
Ahmed, & Gabriela P. Vizcaino eds., 2011).
289. See Anne van Aaken & Tobias A Lehmann, Sustainable Development and
International Investment Law: An Harmonious View from Economics, in PROSPECTS IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 317-39 (Roberto Echandi & Pierre Sauvé
eds., 2013).
290. See Michael Froman, Remarks at the close of the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership Negotiating round in Brussels, USTR (Feb. 26, 2016)
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/speechestranscripts/2016/February/USPress-Statement-TTIP-Round-Brussels.

1152 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:1081
strengthening the substance of the investment clauses in the new
FTAs. While the transformative procedural architecture of the ICS is
well established we question whether its substantive clauses on the
right to regulate and fair and equitable treatment are well-equipped to
engage with emerging questions of corporate social responsibility,
sustainable development and human rights arising in international
investment disputes.

